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ABSTRACT 
 
Design Modification for the Modular Helium Reactor for Higher Temperature Operation 
and Reliability Studies for Nuclear Hydrogen Production Processes. (May 2007)  
S.M. Mohsin Reza; B.S., Dhaka University of Engineering and Technology (DUET), 
Bangladesh; 
M.S., Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee:  Dr. Kenneth Lee Peddicord 
 
Design options have been evaluated for the Modular Helium Reactor (MHR) for 
higher temperature operation. An alternative configuration for the MHR coolant inlet 
flow path is developed to reduce the peak vessel temperature (PVT). The coolant inlet 
path is shifted from the annular path between reactor core barrel and vessel wall through 
the permanent side reflector (PSR). The number and dimensions of coolant holes are 
varied to optimize the pressure drop, the inlet velocity, and the percentage of graphite 
removed from the PSR to create this inlet path. With the removal of ~10% of the 
graphite from PSR the PVT is reduced from 541 0C to 421 0C.  
A new design for the graphite block core has been evaluated and optimized to 
reduce the inlet coolant temperature with the aim of further reduction of PVT. The 
dimensions and number of fuel rods and coolant holes, and the triangular pitch have 
been changed and optimized. Different packing fractions for the new core design have 
been used to conserve the number of fuel particles. Thermal properties for the fuel 
elements are calculated and incorporated into these analyses. The inlet temperature, mass 
flow and bypass flow are optimized to limit the peak fuel temperature (PFT) within an 
acceptable range.  
Using both of these modifications together, the PVT is reduced to ~350 0C while 
keeping the outlet temperature at 950 0C and maintaining the PFT within acceptable 
limits. The vessel and fuel temperatures during low pressure conduction cooldown and 
 iv 
 
 
 
 
high pressure conduction cooldown transients are found to be well below the design 
limits.  
The reliability and availability studies for coupled nuclear hydrogen production 
processes based on the sulfur iodine thermochemical process and high temperature 
electrolysis process have been accomplished. The fault tree models for both these 
processes are developed. Using information obtained on system configuration, 
component failure probability, component repair time and system operating modes and 
conditions, the system reliability and availability are assessed. Required redundancies 
are made to improve system reliability and to optimize the plant design for economic 
performance. The failure rates and outage factors of both processes are found to be well 
below the maximum acceptable range.  
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NERI   Nuclear Engineering Research Initiative  
NRC  Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
RCCS  Reactor Cavity Cooling System   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A conceptual design to produce hydrogen using Modular Helium Reactor (MHR) 
is currently being developed under the Nuclear Energy Research Initiative (NERI) 
project sponsored by United States Department of Energy (DOE). This project is led by 
General Atomics (GA) and is supported by the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), Texas 
A&M University and Entergy Nuclear Inc.   
The purposes and goals of these studies are to: 
• Make the nuclear hydrogen production process more efficient and more 
economic by increasing process temperature and system reliability. 
• Evaluate design options to increase the coolant outlet temperature of the Modular 
Helium Reactor (MHR) for higher overall efficiency of nuclear hydrogen 
production using both the Sulfur-Iodine (SI) thermochemical process and High 
Temperature Electrolysis (HTE) process. 
• Keep the reactor vessel temperature as low as possible in spite of this higher 
coolant outlet temperature. This will allow the use of low cost materials for the 
reactor vessel. 
• Develop Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) models for both the SI and HTE 
plant and perform the reliability/availability studies for both these nuclear 
hydrogen production processes. 
• Improve the overall system reliability/availability by using component 
redundancies where it is necessary for high efficiency hydrogen production. 
 
________________ 
This dissertation follows the style of Nuclear Technology.  
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A. Nuclear Hydrogen 
1. Need for Nuclear Hydrogen 
Hydrogen is considered a promising energy carrier for the 21st century. It holds 
the potential to provide a clean, reliable and affordable energy supply that can enhance 
the world’s economy and environment. It also has the potential to replace or supplement 
the fossil fuels used in the transportation sector throughout the world. Combustion of 
fossil fuel is used for transportation, electricity generation, process heat, fuel for 
industries and other important applications. As the reserves of new resources are 
declining, the limited supply of fossil fuel is becoming a key concern for the energy 
sectors throughout the world. The pollutants and carbon dioxide emissions from fossil 
fuel are also an increasing concern. The carbon dioxide emissions from the fossil fuel are 
thought to be responsible for global warming, which is now a part of international 
treaties1. 
These drawbacks argue for the reduction of the consumption of fossil fuel as well 
as for the replacement with a less polluting, environmentally friendly and potentially 
more sustainable primary energy such as nuclear energy. Conventional nuclear power 
plants produce electrical energy. However, currently the transportation section is 
completely dependent on fossil fuel.  
The world currently produces more than 50 million metric tons of hydrogen per 
year2. Most of this hydrogen is used in chemicals production, petroleum refining, metal 
treating, electrical applications, etc. But currently there is no large-scale cost-effective 
environmental friendly commercial hydrogen production plant. Most of the hydrogen 
production plants use natural gas as a raw material which produces CO2 as a byproduct. 
Hydrogen can be produced in different ways including steam reforming, electrolysis, 
thermochemical cycles, high-temperature electrolysis, etc.  More than 95% of current 
hydrogen production in the United States comes from steam methane reforming which 
releases large amounts of CO2 to the atmosphere. In addition to overall system 
efficiency, the need to severely curtail of CO2 emissions might be one of the most 
important criteria for selection of a hydrogen production process3. Nuclear driven 
 3 
hydrogen production processes appear to be the best selection where water is cracked at 
high temperature using nuclear heat without any CO2 emissions.  
 
2. Nuclear Hydrogen Process 
Nuclear hydrogen production focuses on water splitting technologies4-5. Nuclear 
driven water splitting can be accomplished by either high-temperature electrolysis or 
thermo-chemical processes. Both of these processes can produce hydrogen with a 
reasonable efficiency without the emissions of CO2 or any other air pollutions. In order 
to get competitive efficiencies, both processes require very high process temperature 
(850 0C or above). As a result, both of these hydrogen production technologies can 
benefit from the development of advanced high-temperature GEN-IV nuclear reactors 
capable of delivering heat at temperature in the range of 850 0C -1000 0C.    
Much works have been done and published regarding nuclear driven hydrogen 
production technologies. In one study, the University of Kentucky (UK) collected all 
chemical processes that have been published until then for hydrogen production. GA 
developed a data base with those chemical processes. With a number of screening 
criteria such as process efficiency, number of chemicals, temperature range, equipment 
requirements, etc, GA selected the SI cycle for further studies1.  
The reactor selection task was headed by Sandia National Laboratory (SNL). 
SNL took into consideration 9 different kinds of reactor starting from Light Water 
Reactor (LWR) which have been successfully commercialized, to helium and metal 
cooled reactors which have not been commercialized but have been demonstrated. 
Evaluating all of these reactors based on a set of design requirements and performance 
criteria which are required for hydrogen production, SNL rated the helium cooled 
reactor, liquid metal reactor and the molten salt reactor as the best. Since nuclear 
hydrogen production using the helium gas cooled reactor requires the least amount of 
further development, the MHR was selected as the most promising reactor concept for 
nuclear hydrogen production6.  
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Although much of the initial focus by GA has been on the thermochemical 
process, recent evaluations recommend that the development of the HTE process should 
be pursued in addition to the thermo-chemical (SI) cycles7-8. HTE water splitting 
supported by nuclear heat and electricity has the potential to produce H2 with overall 
system efficiencies of 45%~55%, which is comparable to the efficiencies achievable 
with the SI process. However, the HTE process does not have corrosion concerns like 
the thermo-chemical processes and the design appears to be much less complicated (with 
fewer components) than the design of many thermochemical processes.  
An electrolysis process without heat source has an overall efficiency of about 
25% which is the product of electricity production efficiency ~33% and hydrogen 
production efficiency ~75%. Both the electrolysis without heat and HTE process do not 
produce CO2 as byproduct. Also by electrolysis process without heat, hydrogen can be 
produced at the site of use instead of a central location which eventually reduces the 
hydrogen transportation cost. In lieu of all these advances, HTE process is preferable for 
its higher efficiency.   
As of the current direction of global hydrogen economy and roadmap of 
hydrogen energy, DOE expects to produce hydrogen using both the SI thermo-chemical 
process and the HTE process. Required heat for these hydrogen production plants will be 
provided by nuclear reactor which in our case is the MHR. In this first and 
demonstration nuclear driven hydrogen production plant, the total 600 MWt power of 
each reactor will be used for hydrogen production only. In addition to hydrogen, 
electricity will be produced for utilities in the near future with this kind of reactors.  
The designs discussed in this dissertation consist of four individual and 
completely separate chemical/HTE plants. Each plant will be connected to a 600 MWt 
MHR. The complete nuclear plant will have 4 identical reactors each of 600 MWt. The 
reactor core is a helium-cooled, graphite-moderated, prismatic block design. These 
concepts are referred to as the SI-based H2-MHR and HTE-based H2-MHR 
respectively. 
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B. Modular Helium Reactor 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. MHR and the power conversion system.9 
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The reactor system design is based on the Gas Turbine-Modular Helium Reactor 
(GT-MHR) design. This concept is chosen by GA as the representative very high 
temperature gas cooled reactor for further development and demonstration. Figure 1 
shows the reactor vessel and the Power Conversion System (PCS) within the reactor 
building.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. MHR pressure vessel and internal details.9 
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The entire reactor confinement structure is located underground. The reactor 
vessel and PCS are located side by side and are connected directly with each other by a 
cross vessel. The reactor vessel is located somewhat higher than the PCS vessel to avoid 
any natural circulation from reactor vessel to the PCS vessel during loss of flow accident 
(station blackout).   
Figure 2 shows the detailed arrangement of the reactor vessel internals of the 
MHR. The inlet helium at 490 0C and ~7 MPa pressure flows upwards through the 
rectangular box-shaped path located at the annulus between reactor core barrel and 
reactor vessel wall. The inlet helium temperature is the main determinant of vessel 
operating temperature. The helium then flows through the upper core plenum and flows 
downward through the core. The majority of the coolant flows through the reactor core 
i.e. through the coolant holes. A fraction of flow (~10%) bypasses these channels, 
passing through the gaps between the reactor core blocks, reflector blocks and through 
the gaps surrounding the control rod assemblies.  
The plant is designed for a 60 years life with a capacity factor of at least 80%. 
The reactor is helium cooled and graphite moderated with a power density as low as 6.5 
w/cm3. The prismatic reactor core consists of hexagonal graphite blocks. The fueled 
region is annular as shown in Figure 3 and is surrounded by inner and outer reflectors. 
About one third of the graphite blocks are fueled blocks and the remaining two thirds are 
reflector blocks. During transients the large amount of graphite acts as a temporal heat 
sink to keep the Peak Fuel Temperature (PFT) well below the design limit. Also during 
transients, the high volumetric heat capacity of the graphite core material ensures a long 
delay before the fuels attain its peak temperature.  
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Fig. 3. Annular core arrangement of MHR.9 
 
 
 
The MHR fuel element consists of coated particle fuel kernels formed into fuel 
rods and inserted into graphite fuel elements. The fuel consists of spherical TRISO 
coated fuel particles which are 1 mm in diameter having several composite layers as 
shown in Figure 4. Each particle consists of a kernel of uranium oxycarbide (UCO) 
surrounded by a porous carbon buffer, pyrolytic carbon layer, silicon carbide layer and 
finally the second pyrolytic carbon layer. The porous carbon buffer absorbs radiation 
damage, allows space required for fission gas produced during irradiation, and resists 
kernel migration at very high temperature. The silicon carbide layer is the primary 
pressure boundary for the micro-sphere. It is also the primary containment of fission 
products produced during irradiation and accident condition. The pyrolytic carbon layers 
shrink under irradiation, providing compressive forces that protect the silicon carbide 
layer. The inner pyrolytic carbon layer protects the kernel from corrosive gases that are 
present during the deposition of silicon carbide layer.   
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Fig. 4. Schematic of a TRISO coated fuel particle, compacts and fuel elements.9 
 
 
The passive safety of this reactor system is achieved by designing a core cool-
down system that limits the peak fuel temperature to below 1600 0C during any 
postulated loss-of-coolant accident. This is accomplished by conducting the decay heat 
rapidly through the core and pressure vessel and radiating it into passive air-cooled 
Reactor Cavity Cooling System (RCCS). The reactor also has Reserve Shutdown 
Control (RSC) that is redundant to the reactor scram by insertion of control rods. If both 
the control rod and reserve shutdown control fail, the temperature coefficient of 
reactivity will shutdown the reactor from any power level during loss of forced 
convection cooling. There is also a non-safety shutdown cooling system used only to 
remove decay heat during normal shutdowns. Several references can be referred to for 
more details of conceptual design of MHR.3, 10 
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C. SI-Based H2-MHR 
1. Main Coupled Chemical Reaction 
In the case of the SI-based H2-MHR, the total 600 MWt power is provided as 
process heat for the SI plant through an Intermediate Heat Exchanger (IHX). Figure 5 
shows the coupled chemical reaction for this process. The complete SI plant has three 
interconnected sections. The sulfuric acid decomposition plant needs a higher 
temperature than the hydrogen iodide decomposition plant. The nuclear reactor will 
provide heat for these plants through heat exchangers. The sulfuric acid production plant 
(Bunsen reaction process) is exothermic and does not require heat addition for the 
reactions.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Coupled chemical reactions of SI cycle.9 
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As the further development of these flow sheets is on going, recent modified 
flow sheets have been considered for this analysis. All three sections are described here 
briefly. Details of these flow sheets including pressure, mass flow, material balance, 
content of each stream, component size, numbers of each component, etc, are available 
in the GA report1.  
 
2. Bunsen Reaction Process 
Figure 6 is a schematic for Bunsen reaction process where the HI and H2SO4 are 
formed. This reaction is central to the overall process as shown in the previous figure. 
The majority of the Bunsen reaction takes places at chemical reactor R101 at 7 bars. 
This reaction also takes place in the primary oxygen scrubber C101, the secondary 
oxygen scrubber C104 and the sulfuric acid boost reactor C103. The output of heat 
exchanger and chemical reactor R101 consists of three phases that are separated in 
separator S101. From the gas phase the SO2 is separated at C101 and recycled. The 
residual H2O is removed from O2 at separator S104 and S105 and most of the O2 is 
vented to atmosphere but a portion is recycled at stripper C102. SO2 and O2 are 
separated at C102 and are fed to the H2SO4 boost reactor C103 where the concentration 
of H2SO4 is increased from 15% mole to 20% mole. Further improvement of acid 
concentration takes place at S102 and a relatively high concentrated sulfuric acid with 
SO2 and H2O in it, is fed to the H2SO4 decomposition section through streamline 140. 
The HI from C102 having I2 and H2O in it, is sent to HI decomposition section through 
stream line 138.   
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Fig. 6. Process schematic of Bunsen reaction process.1 
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 3. Sulfuric Acid Concentration and Decomposition Section 
This section has the highest process temperature. The schematic diagram for this 
section is shown in Figure 7. This flow sheet was developed independently at the 
University of Kentucky and Aspen Plus®. Aspen process simulator software was used 
for generating this flow sheet. The purposes of this section are to concentrate H2SO4 and 
decompose the concentrated H2SO4 into SO2 and O2. Dilute H2SO4 is fed from the 
Bunsen reaction section through pump P204. Then the H2SO4 is heated and water is 
removed by a series of flash drum and separator. Required heat for heating, vaporizing 
and decomposing H2SO4 is provided by the high temperature helium from the MHR. 
The main decomposer E207 is the heat exchanger where H2SO4 is decomposed. The 
product SO2 is sent to the Bunsen reaction section. To reduce the amount of heat 
required in the decomposer to decompose the H2SO4, the concentration of H2SO4 is 
increased before it enters the decomposer. Due to this increased concentration the total 
volume of H2SO4 is reduced and as a result a smaller heat exchanger for the system can 
be used. This also helps to improve the thermodynamic efficiency of the heat exchanger.  
A baseline flow sheet was designed at 827 0C peak process temperature. The 
flow sheet shows reasonable efficiency and reduced cost at the 827 0C level, with the 
potential for higher efficiency and further reduced costs at higher process operating 
temperatures. The H2SO4 absorber recovers essentially all of the un-reacted H2SO4 and 
uses the heat of condensation of H2SO4 to concentrate H2SO4 before it is fed to the high 
temperature H2SO4 decomposition system.  The remaining thermal energy in the H2SO4 
decomposition products is recovered and used to concentrate the acid.    
 
4. Hydrogen Iodide Decomposition Section 
The HI/I2/H20 product from the Bunsen reaction section is pumped to the 
hydrogen iodide decomposition section which is shown in Figure 8 and then it is heated 
and fed to the reactive distillation column (C301).  After reaction, the portion containing 
most of the iodine and the portion containing most of the water are fed back to the 
Bunsen reaction section. The H2 product is scrubbed and the final product is collected.  
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Fig. 7. Schematic of sulfuric acid concentration and decomposition section.1 
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Fig. 8. Hydrogen iodide decomposition section.1 
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D. HTE-Based H2-MHR 
High temperature electrolysis involves the splitting of water into hydrogen and 
oxygen at high temperatures. The primary advantages of HTE over the conventional 
electrolysis which is a well established technology is that considerably high hydrogen 
conversion efficiencies can be achieved. This is because the conversion efficiency of 
heat to electricity is low compared to using heat directly in the hydrogen production 
process. Therefore, in the HTE process, a portion of total energy needed to split the 
water is added as heat instead of electricity, so the required energy is reduced and as a 
result the overall process efficiency is improved.  
In the case of HTE-based MHR, the total 600 MWt power is split into two major 
parts. About 10% of the thermal power (~68 MWt) is used to heat the feed water 
delivered to the electrolysis stack8. The remaining thermal power is provided to a 
Brayton Cycle Power Conversion System (BC-PCS) to produce the electricity required 
to drive the electrolysis process (about 290 MWe). The BC-PCS consist of compressor, 
turbine, recuperator, intercooler, generator, etc. The conceptual design of HTE based 
hydrogen production plant developed at INL11 using HYSYS code and is shown in 
Figure 9. 
The HTE plant consists of several interconnected sections such as heat transfer 
section, hydrogen production and collection section, sweep water section etc. The heated 
steam (~90%) and hydrogen (~10%) mixture is fed to high temperature electrolysis 
stack. The portion of hydrogen is re-circulated from the final product and it helps to 
prevent oxidation of the nickel at the electrolysis stack. The residual heat is recovered 
from the final product to increase the thermal efficiency of the process.  
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Fig. 9. Schematic diagram of HTE plant.9 
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CHAPTER II 
CURRENT STATUS AND PROPOSED RESEARCH 
 
 
A. Current Status of the Problem 
1. Design Modification for the MHR for Higher Temperature Operation 
The design of the reactor for hydrogen production applications based on the Gas 
Turbine-Modular Helium Reactor (GT-MHR) was developed at GA. The reactor itself is 
referred to as the MHR and the reactor connected to a hydrogen production process is 
referred to as the H2-MHR. A thermal hydraulic analysis model which includes the 
MHR vessel system, RCCS and the containment system has been developed at the INL 
for steady-state and transient analyses.  
A number of studies have been performed to evaluate design options for 
optimizing the MHR to achieve higher reactor outlet operating temperature. A number of 
thermal hydraulic computer codes have been used for analyses. The results of these 
analyses showed that although increasing the coolant outlet temperatures of the MHR 
resulted in higher hydrogen production efficiencies, the resulting steady-state reactor 
vessel temperatures were found to be higher than the desired vessel temperatures.  
In one study GA evaluated the possible minimum inlet temperature for a certain 
coolant outlet temperature3. It may be noted here that, the inlet coolant temperature is 
one of the main determinants of the steady state vessel temperature. So a reduction of 
coolant inlet temperature would cause a reduced vessel temperature for MHR. Reactor 
having different core heights (10, 12 and 14 blocks high of core) with different power 
densities and coolant flow rates had been considered for those analyses. The results 
demonstrate that, there is a limit beyond which the ∆T across the core may not be 
increased for current graphite block core design. The inlet temperature may not be 
reduced below a certain limit for a particular core length and for a particular coolant 
outlet temperature.   
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Several studies12-13, were under taken in an effort to reduce the steady-state 
reactor vessel temperature. In those analyses the inlet coolant flow path was shifted from 
the annular path between reactor core barrel and vessel wall into the center of the inner 
reflector. For that modification a numbers of graphite columns (7 to 19) were removed 
from the center reflector to create the flow path for the inlet helium coolant. Calculations 
were performed for core inlet temperatures of 490 0C to 600 0C and a core outlet 
temperature of 1000 0C. The results of this initial assessment were found to be 
promising. The steady-state reactor vessel temperatures were reduced to values that were 
within the design limit of the reactor vessel material, and the peak vessel temperature 
and peak fuel temperature during transient conditions were found to be within the 
acceptable limit. However, since the central graphite reflector in a MHR serves as both a 
heat sink and moderator, the removal of graphite blocks from the center of the reactor is 
not a desired option from some other thermal hydraulic and neutronic points of view.  
 
2. Reliability and Availability Studies 
Reliability, availability and maintainability assessments of the MHR had been 
performed by ‘Strategic Power System Incorporation’ using the ‘Operational Reliability 
Analysis Program’ and the results of these studies had been reported10. However, no 
effort had been taken for the reliability studies of the entire nuclear hydrogen production 
process with the MHR coupled to the hydrogen production processes.  
To perform the reliability studies for the entire nuclear hydrogen production 
processes, the PRA models for both the HTE and SI based nuclear hydrogen production 
plants will need to be developed. The reliability code which is capable and commonly 
used to analyze nuclear system needs to be used for the reliability studies of these 
hydrogen production plants and the Brayton cycle power conversion system with the aim 
of having a complete PRA model for this couple nuclear hydrogen production process.   
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B. Proposed Research 
 
1. Design Modification for the MHR for Higher Temperature Operation 
 Two design modifications for the MHR will be performed and evaluated to allow 
the reactor a higher outlet temperature than the current outlet temperature of 850 0C. The 
conventional coolant inlet path and the current reactor core design will be modified to 
achieve the desired goal. The objective of this proposed study is to reduce the steady-
state reactor vessel temperature, while allowing the coolant outlet temperature to 
increase to achieve higher hydrogen production efficiencies and maintaining the fuel 
centerline temperature within acceptable limit.  
First, the design of an alternative configuration for the reactor coolant inlet flow 
path of MHR will be performed. In the existing reactor design, the rectangular boxed 
channels located at the annular channel between the reactor vessel wall and the reactor 
core barrel, are used for the coolant inlet flow. In this proposed configuration the inlet 
coolant flow path will be through the permanent outer reflector or permanent side 
reflector (PSR).  
This alternative configuration for the coolant inlet flow is a completely new 
concept. With this new configuration the PVT during steady state and transient operation 
is expected to be well below the ASME code limit for the current vessel material. This 
reduced steady state vessel temperature will result in a significant reduction of cost for 
the reactor vessel material. A thermal hydraulic code will be used for these analyses and 
for the optimization of the reactor coolant flow passage design. During this modification, 
the total pressure drop, amount of graphite removal from the core to create the coolant 
path and the inlet coolant velocity will be optimized and maintained within the 
acceptable limits. 
In addition to modified coolant scheme through PSR another way the vessel 
temperature can be reduced is by reducing the inlet coolant temperature. The 
modification and optimization of the new core design in a MHR which will allow an 
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increase in the ∆T across the reactor core while maintaining the Peak Fuel Centerline 
Temperature (PFCT) within limit will be performed and evaluated.  
With the current block core design, the ∆T across the core would be ~360 0C. 
Therefore, the inlet temperature of MHR for a higher outlet temperature of 950 0C can 
not be reduced below 590 0C. The new block core design will allow an increased ∆T 
across the reactor core. This increased ∆T across the reactor core will result in a reduced 
coolant inlet temperature for the same coolant outlet temperature of 950 0C. This 
reduced inlet temperature will lead to a reduced vessel peak temperature during normal 
operation.  
 
2. Reliability and Availability Studies 
For this part of study, the object is to develop a PRA model for both SI based and 
HTE based hydrogen production plants. Using the developed models the reliability and 
the availability of the plant design will be calculated. Where appropriate, component 
redundancies will be incorporated into the designs to improve system reliability for 
better economic performance. Using a PRA code to analyze a process plant with lots of 
recycling of fluids is a unique effort. The fault tree model for the SI plant and the HTE 
plant will be developed. From the available reliability data source for the components, 
the mean failure probability for each component, its mean repair time and uncertainty of 
these data will be evaluated. Reliability data for a particular component from different 
data sources will be compared and the most relevant data will be incorporated for this 
reliability study. The fault tree analysis will provide the system reliability and 
availability for a particular mission time.  
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CHAPTER III 
RELAP5-3D/ATHENA PLANT MODEL 
 
A. RELAP5-3D/ATHENA Code 
The RELAP5-3D© (Reactor Excursion and Leak Analysis Program-3 
Dimensional) code14 is an outgrowth of the one-dimensional RELAP5/MOD3 computer 
code developed at Idaho National Laboratory (INL). It was developed under the 
sponsorship of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the U.S. Department of 
Energy (DOE), and a consortium of several countries and domestic organizations that 
were members of the International Code Assessment and Application Program (ICAP), 
and its successor, the Code Application and Maintenance Program (CAMP). The code 
has been regularly updated since the time of its inception in 1979. Following the 
accident at Chernobyl, DOE decided to reassess the safety of all existing reactors 
throughout the United States.  The RELAP5 code was chosen at that time as the thermal-
hydraulic analysis tool because of its widespread acceptance. It is a best estimate code 
that can be used for transient simulation during postulated accidents such as Loss of 
Coolant Accident (LOCA), anticipated transient without scram, loss of offsite power, 
loss of feed water, turbine trip, etc. 
 The RELAP5-3D
 
version of the code contains several important enhancements 
over the previous single dimensional RELAP5 code. The most prominent attribute that 
distinguishes the RELAP-3D
 
code from the previous single dimensional RELAP5 code 
is it is fully integrated, and capable for multidimensional thermal-hydraulic and kinetic 
modeling. These capabilities remove any restrictions on the applicability of the code to 
the full range of postulated reactor accidents. The other enhancements of RELAP5-3D 
are the inclusion of a new matrix solver for 3-D problems, new water properties and 
improved time advancement for greater robustness of the code.  
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 The code has two options for the computation of reactor power. They are: point 
reactor kinetic model and multidimensional neutron kinetic model. The point reactor 
kinetic model developed at the INL is the simplest model which is used to compute the 
transient behavior of neutron fission power. The power in this model is computed using 
point reactor kinetic approximation. This approximation is adequate for cases where the 
space distribution remains nearly constant. The multidimensional neutron kinetic model 
was developed at North Carolina State University under an INL initiative. It solves the 
two or four group neutron diffusion equations in either Cartesian or hexagonal geometry 
using the Nodal Expansion Method (NEM) and the non-linear iteration technique. 
Several different core symmetry options and several boundary options are available in 
this model. 
 The foundation of the Advanced Thermal Energy Network Analysis (ATHENA) 
computer code15 is RELAP5-3D. The ATHENA code was also developed at the INL 
under the sponsorship of U.S. Department of Energy. To expand the capability of 
RELAP code, new working fluids, new heat transfer models, and a new hydrodynamic 
model was added to the ATHENA code. In addition to LWRs, ATHENA can be used to 
analyze reactors with a variety of working fluids including helium, hydrogen, nitrogen, 
ammonia lithium, sodium, lead-bismuth etc. ATHENA can also be used for space 
reactor applications since a user defined gravitational constant can be used.  
 
B. Description of Plant Model 
A RLAP5-3D/ATHENA model of MHR was developed at the INL in support of 
the GEN IV program.  A detail description of the original ATHENA plant model and 
results of the initial thermal hydraulic analyses has been reported3. The current 
ATHENA model of MHR is a simplified model that is designed to examine the core 
behavior. This ATHENA model is basis for further development and further calculation 
for reactor primary system. Components outside the primary system and some of the 
vessel internals are ignored.  
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Fig. 10. Original reactor vessel nodalization. 
 
 
 
Figure 10 shows the original reactor vessel nodalization developed by the INL. 
As shown in the nodalization, the coolant enters the vessel through the vessel inlet 
(component 110), flows upward through the annular channel boxes located between 
reactor vessel and reactor core barrel (component 130), and up to the inlet plenum 
(component 140). The inlet flow is assumed to occupy the entire region between the core 
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barrel and the reactor vessel since the dead helium volume is not modeled. Two time 
dependent volume (components 100 and 170) provide the system boundaries.  
From the inlet plenum, the coolant flows down through the core. The core is 
modeled with three parallel channels (components 152, 154 and 156), each representing 
one of the three rings in the annular fueled region. Two core bypass channels are 
modeled, one in the inner reflector (component 142) and the other in the outer reflector 
(component 145). After exiting the core the coolant flows through the core outlet plenum 
(component 160) and finally flows out of the vessel. The inlet flow is controlled to 
achieve the desired helium outlet temperature.  
The heat structures are used to model most of the structural component in the 
vessel.  The active core has ten axial nodes each representing one of the fuel blocks. 
Each axial node of the active core has 102 fuel blocks. The inner ring, middle ring and 
the outer ring of the annular shaped active core contain 30, 36 and 36 assemblies, 
respectively, in each level. The upper and the lower reflectors are also modeled as two 
additional axial blocks. The outer permanent and replaceable reflectors along with the 
core barrel are modeled as a single integrated component in the ATHENA model.   
The RCCS and containment nodalization are shown in Figure 11. The 
containment (component 900) and the reactor cavity cooling system (RCCS) which is 
located on the interior of the containment are also modeled. The surrounding wall of the 
containment is modeled as a very thick wall consists of a ~1 m thick of concrete and 5 m 
thick of surrounding soil.  
Air from atmosphere enters the RCCS inlet plenum (component 955) and flows 
downward through the down comer to the RCCS lower header distributor which is 
located at the bottom of the containment. Then the hot air flows through the riser and 
passes through outlet plenum and eventually flows to the atmosphere.  
Radial and axial conduction are modeled in the core and reflectors. Radiation 
heat transfer is modeled from the core barrel to the reactor vessel, from the vessel to the 
RCCS, and from the RCCS to the containment. The RCCS is modeled as a dry air-filled 
system. The risers are modeled as three separate structures, connected by conduction. 
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The loss coefficients in the plena are adjusted to provide the desired heat removal rate 
for the MHR. The reactor vessel structure outside the core region is modeled. The vessel 
below the core extends as a cylinder to half the depth of the hemispherical lower head. 
The entire upper head hemisphere is modeled, as is a hemisphere in the inlet plenum 
separating the upper plenum from the up flow annulus.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 11. Containment and RCCS nodalization in ATHENA model. 
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C. Validation of the Plant Model 
It is always advisable to validate the accuracy of any model before proceeding 
with additional calculations. If there is any mistake in the original model, that will 
negate the whole calculation process. The original model may not have come directly 
from the developer. Sometime it comes through other person or agency, and in some 
cases may have been changed or modified by others. These modeling changes could lead 
to inaccurate or unrealistic results unless the model is adequately validated. 
For our case, it is necessary to obtain satisfactory steady-state conditions from 
the ATHENA model before initiating any transient calculations. A limited validation of 
this original ATHENA model was performed using available design data for the MHR16. 
The validation process assessed the accuracy of the original and any modification made 
to the model. Usually a plant model is considered validated17 if: 
• It is in geometrical agreement with the described system 
• It reproduces the supposed condition of the system and 
• It shows a satisfactory behavior under transient or time dependent conditions 
The ATHENA model has been validated for a number of thermal hydraulic 
transients including Low Pressure Conduction Cooldown (LPCC) and High Pressure 
Conduction Cooldown (HPCC) at INL. The basis for this present validation process has 
been the design data of MHR.  
The steady-state validation consists of the acquisition of structural and 
operational data from the MHR. When the nominal measured steady-state is reproduced, 
this validation process is considered complete. For validation of transient result, the 
results of transient calculation such as LPCC and HPCC from GA calculated values and 
the ATHENA calculated values are compared.  The steady-state validation consisted of a 
comparison of several nominal steady-state values (GA calculated values) and the 
ATHENA calculated values are shown in Table I. The transient validation results are 
shown in Table II.  
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TABLE I  MHR Design Value and Steady State Calculated Value 
Parameters Expected ATHENA 
Coolant flow rate (kg/sec) 320 324.18 
Core pressure drop (MPa) 0.051 0.0508 
RCCS power (MW) 3.3 3.2926 
RCCS flow rate (kg/sec) 14.3 14.1481 
RCCS air outlet temperature (C) 274 270.757 
Reactor vessel temperature (C) 446 453 
 
 
 
TABLE II  Result of MHR Transient Validation 
LPCC 
Transient pressure 
1 atm 
HPCC 
Transient pressure 
5.03 MPa. 
Parameters 
Expected ATHENA Expected ATHENA 
Peak fuel temperature (C)/time (h) 1447/63 1437/58.7 1223/45 1276/58 
Peak vessel temperature (C) /time (h) 502/81 500/77.5 457/70 467/73.8 
 
.  
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CHAPTER IV 
OPTIMIZATION OF NEW COOLANT CONFIGURATION  
FOR MHR 
 
A. Effect of Increased Coolant Temperature 
As was mentioned before, the coolant inlet and outlet temperatures in the original 
GA MHR design were 490 0C and 850 0C, respectively. The thermal efficiency of the SI 
based hydrogen production process with a peak process temperature which corresponds 
to coolant outlet temperature of 850 0C from a MHR is found to be ~42%. With a higher 
peak process temperature which corresponds to coolant outlet temperature of 950 0C, the 
estimated thermal efficiency is ~52%1. The thermal efficiency of HTE process is also a 
strong function of its process temperature and increases with the increase of MHR 
coolant outlet temperature at the similar range.7 
To achieve higher hydrogen production efficiencies from both SI and HTE 
processes, the coolant outlet temperature of the H2-MHR has been increased from 850 
0C to 950 0C. A coolant outlet temperature beyond this will increase the hydrogen 
production efficiency even further, but the coolant outlet temperature is limited to 950 
0C to avoid any potential adverse impacts on fuel performance during steady state 
normal operation of the MHR18. The temperature limit of structural and vessel materials 
are also need to be considered. In addition, a higher coolant outlet temperature beyond 
950 0C for MHR may require significant advances in technology to develop a viable 
design of intermediate heat exchanger (IHX) which is used to transfer process heat from 
MHR to hydrogen production plants. In order to maintain the same coolant flow rate 
through the core and to maintain the same convective heat transfer rate within the core, 
the inlet coolant temperature is also increased from 490 0C to 590 0C. 
Table III shows the effect of the changes in inlet and outlet temperatures on some 
of the plant parameters. Case 1 shows nominal steady-states ATHENA calculated 
 30 
parameters with core inlet and outlet temperatures of 490 0C and 850 0C respectively, 
which corresponds to the GT-MHR baseline design conditions. A hypothetical case 
where the inlet coolant temperature is kept same as the original case but the coolant 
outlet temperature is increased to 950 0C is shown in case 2. Case 3 shows the expected 
inlet temperature for an outlet temperature of 950 0C for the MHR with current block 
core design, where this higher coolant outlet temperature is assigned to get higher 
efficiency for the MHR driven hydrogen production process. The reason why the inlet 
temperature can not be reduced below 590 0C for a coolant outlet temperature of 950 0C 
is discussed in more details in Chapter V where this inlet temperature is reduced by 
modifying the reactor core design.  
 
 
TABLE III  Effect of Increased Inlet Temperature from 490 0C to 950 0C 
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1 490 850 324 7.0 50.8 0.86 453 3.29 53.0 
2 490 950 253 7.0 33.86 0.82 452 3.25 41.9 
3 590 950 324 7.0 56.0 0.86 541 4.49 53.02 
 
 
 
Case 1 is considered as the base case for this analysis which is same as the 
original reactor design. Coolant flow rate for case 1 is 324 kg/sec and will remain same 
during this modification since ∆T across the reactor core is expected to be same. Total 
pressure drop for this case is about 50 KPa.  
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In the current design of the coolant inlet flow the inlet coolant flow cross 
sectional area is huge, and the hydraulic diameter of the coolant inlet flow path is much 
higher than the hydraulic diameter of the core. So almost all the pressure drop occurs in 
the core, a negligible pressure drop occurs in the coolant inlet flow path. The maximum 
steady-state vessel temperature in this case is 453.3 0C which is within acceptable range 
for the current vessel material. During this analysis the vessel is discritized into several 
volumes and the ‘maximum vessel temperature’ is determined in each time step from the 
volume wherever it is the maximum at that time step. The core maximum velocity is also 
calculated in the same way. The coolant flow path through the core is discritized into 
several control volumes. First the velocity for each of the volume at each time step is 
calculated and then the maximum core velocity is determined from a volume wherever it 
is the maximum at that time step. 
As mentioned before, there is a limit beyond which the coolant inlet temperature 
can not be reduced for a constant outlet temperature and for a particular core height with 
current block core design. Based on this, case 2 is an unrealistic case. But it might be 
helpful to observe the different parameters with this inlet and outlet temperatures. There 
is a huge reduction of mass flow rate, core maximum velocity and pressure drop in this 
case compared to case 1, but the steady state peak vessel temperature and the heat 
rejected through RCCS remain within the same range.  
With the increased inlet temperature from 490 0C to 590 0C and coolant outlet 
temperature of 950 0C (case 3), the coolant flow rate, the coolant velocity and the 
pressure drop are increased from case 2. In addition, the steady-state maximum vessel 
temperature and the heat loss to RCCS increase with this higher inlet temperature. This 
investigation shows that with the inlet and outlet helium temperatures of 590 0C and 950 
0C respectively the steady state reactor vessel temperature is about 541 0C which is well 
above the ASME code for current reactor vessel material.  
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B. Design and Verification for New Coolant Path 
In an attempt to reduce the steady-state reactor vessel temperature, an alternative 
configuration of the coolant inlet flow path is developed and verified. The coolant inlet 
flow path is shifted from the annular region between reactor vessel and the core barrel to 
inside the permanent outer reflector (i.e., permanent side reflector). Figure 12 shows the 
schematic of the flow path for both the old and the new coolant flow. The original 
coolant inlet flow which flows between reactor core barrel and vessel wall is shown with 
cross (X) sign.  
 
 
 
Fig. 12. The original and the new inlet coolant flow. 
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In the original flow path the helium enters the vessel inlet plenum and flows 
upward through the channel boxes in the annular region between the core barrel and the 
inner vessel wall. This configuration allows direct heat transfer from the hot inlet helium 
flow to the vessel wall. The figure shows the helium in the new flow configuration 
enters the core inlet plenum through the outlet side.  In the new configuration, the helium 
flow path is moved away from the vessel inner wall, and into the outer reflector region.  
This configuration provides greater separation between the coolant flow path and the 
vessel, thereby eliminating direct heat transfer between the hot inlet helium and the 
vessel wall.  
A horizontal cross vessel connects the PCS vessel and MHR vessel. Any heat 
transferred from hot inlet helium direct to the cross vessel wall will result in a higher 
steady state reactor vessel temperature. Therefore, reactor vessel wall also needs to be 
insulated from vessel inlet plenum to prevent any direct heat transfer to the vessel wall 
from the hot helium at the vessel inlet plenum. The cross vessel wall also needs to be 
insulated from hot inlet coolant to prevent direct heat transfer from hot inlet coolant to 
the cross vessel wall. In order to prevent direct heat transfer from the hot inlet helium to 
the vessel wall or to the cross vessel, the necessary insulation has been incorporated in 
the ATHENA model to insulate both the vessel wall and the cross vessel wall from the 
hot inlet coolant.   
  The limiting criteria for the design of this new coolant flow configuration can 
be summarized as follows:  
• Percentage of graphite removed ≤20% of outer reflector 
• The reactor vessel pressure drop ≤90 KPa 
• The coolant/helium velocity in the revised inlet flow passage will be consistent 
with the coolant velocity in the core 
• Steady-state peak vessel temperature will be reduced significantly 
• The modification will not affect the total core bypass assumed for the base case 
model  
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The amount of graphite in the outer reflector is about one half of the total 
graphite in the MHR core. Therefore, a 20% reduction in the graphite in the outer 
permanent reflector represents about 10% of total graphite in the core. If too much 
graphite is removed from the outer reflector then increased neutron leakage from the 
reactor core through the PSR will occur. To overcome the increased leakage, we have to 
add more fuel or we have to remove some burnable poison from the reactor. In addition, 
it would be difficult to limit the neutron dose to the reactor vessel if an excessive amount 
of graphite removal from the PSR is required for this modification.   
The total reactor vessel pressure drop is another important consideration in the 
design of the new coolant inlet flow configuration. The total reactor pressure drop is 
caused by wall roughness, entrance loss coefficient, exit loss coefficient, internal loss 
coefficient etc. The pumping power is proportional to volumetric flow rate and total 
pressure drop of the system.  For the original design the pressure drop within the core 
was 50.8 KPa (from Table III) and the pumping power was ~2%3.  This pumping power 
corresponds to the total pressure drop of the primary loop. In addition to the reactor 
vessel, the primary system has pressure drop of about ~20 KPa, which occurs out side of 
the reactor vessel. Therefore, the total pressure drop that corresponds to the pumping 
power is ~70.8 KPa. If the pumping power of the system is allowed to increase by up to 
3%, which is still below the pumping power of a PWR (~4%-5%), then the total 
allowable pressure drop for the entire primary loop becomes (70.8 X 1.5 =) 106.2 KPa. 
If the modified system has the same velocity, mass flow rate, loss coefficient etc as of 
the original design, then with an increased pumping power of 3%, the pressure drop 
within vessel would be allowed to increase to (106.2 – 20 =) 86.2 Kpa.  
The difference between the coolant flow velocity through the reflector coolant 
passage and the coolant velocity through the reactor core is also an important design 
consideration for the new inlet flow configuration. If there is too much difference 
between these velocities, there may be increased lateral pressure gradients between the 
core and reflector which increases the potential for flow-induced vibrations and cross 
flow. Also, at this point no study has been done to assess the maximum allowable 
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coolant velocity through the nuclear grade graphite. Therefore, limiting the coolant inlet 
velocity in the reflector region to something close to that of the core velocity should be a 
conservative approach.   
The development and evaluation of this new coolant flow path has been done in 
several steps. In the first step the coolant inlet velocity and amount of graphite removed 
to create the inlet flow path are optimized. Based on the optimization results and the 
available thickness of permanent outer reflector, the number of coolant inlet holes and 
their dimensions are selected in the second step; also pressure drops are calculated more 
accurately. In the third step, the relevant changes for the radiation and conduction heat 
transfer calculation in the ATHENA model are made. Due to this final step of 
calculation, the ATHENA model would take in consideration the removal of graphite 
from reactor core during the calculation of radiation and conduction heat transfer in the 
core. The model also would consider the new coolant path exactly at its physical 
location. As a result, the new ATHENA model should compute accurate temperature 
profiles within the core and reflector region, and accurately predict the heat transfer from 
the core and vessel region to the RCCS during normal operation and during transient. 
 
C. Optimization of Amount of Graphite Removal and Coolant Velocity 
Figure 13 shows the nodalization of reactor vessel used for optimization of 
coolant velocity and the amount of graphite removal. Volume 132 is the new coolant 
flow path through the outer permanent reflector. In this modified coolant flow path, the 
outlet of the flow is fed to the outlet side of the core inlet plenum instead of inlet side as 
of the original model. This is because if the outlet is fed to the inlet side of core inlet 
plenum (component 140), the hot inlet helium will transfer heat to the upper head region 
of reactor vessel directly. The reactor vessel wall also needs to be insulated from the 
coolant in the inlet plenum (component 110). These modifications are incorporated in 
the ATHENA model accordingly. Volume 130 is modeled as a stagnant volume with the 
inlet connected to the outlet of the vessel inlet plenum but the outlet is no more 
connected to the core inlet plenum.  
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Fig. 13. ATHENA nodalization for reactor primary to optimize pressure drop, inlet flow 
area and inlet coolant velocity. 
 
 
The heat structures are closely associated with the hydrodynamic volumes in the 
RELAP5-3d/ATHENA model. Any heat structure is solid and there is no flow. The 
hydrodynamic volume can be connected to either the left side (inner surface) or right 
side (outer surface) of a heat structure. The total system response depends on heat 
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transfer between the structures and the fluid. The temperature distributions in the 
structures are often important requirements of the simulation.  
During the optimization step, the outer replaceable reflector, permanent side 
reflector and the reactor core barrel are modeled as a single heat structure as in the 
original model. In this case this heat structure is associated with three hydrodynamic 
volumes. Volume 145 represents the bypass flow through outer reflector which is 
downward, volume 132 is the new coolant upward flow, and volume 130 is the stagnant 
helium. The bypass through the outer reflector and the new coolant flow through 
permanent side reflector are modeled as the left and right volumes respectively. The 
stagnant volume is considered as an adiabatic. This approximation is made only for the 
first step of the analysis, i.e. during the optimization of pressure drop, amount of 
graphite removal and the inlet velocity. This approximation will give us a conservative 
vessel temperature which is higher than the actual vessel temperature. To calculate the 
vessel temperature precisely in the subsequent calculation,, this heat structure is divided 
into two heat structures which is discussed later. 
During optimization, a higher flow area for the inlet flow (volume 132) through 
the permanent outer reflector will result in a higher percentage of graphite withdrawn 
from the permanent side reflector. A reduced cross section area for the inlet flow on the 
other hand will result in a larger pressure drop and the higher inlet velocity. Sensitivity 
studies are performed to determine the effect of changes in total cross sectional area for 
coolant inlet flow, number of holes and dimensions of each hole on the steady-state 
vessel temperature. Table IV shows the results of this study.  
In the original ATHENA model of the MHR, the inlet flow was assumed to 
occupy the entire region between the core barrel and the reactor vessel. The dead helium 
volume was eliminated and was included with the inlet flow path. The total cross 
sectional area in the original ATHENA model for the inlet flow was 4.6193 sq meter.  
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TABLE IV  Optimization of Flow Area, Inlet Velocity and Pressure Drop 
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1 2.30965 14.13 36 0.2858 57.9 1106 454 2.5 53.2 34.83 
2 30 0.31142 57.8 1106 454 2.5 53.2 35.2 
3 24 0.3482 57.7 1106 453.6 2.5 53.2 35.2 
4 
2.285085 13.98 
18 0.40204 57.5 1106 453 2.5 53.2 35.2 
5 24 0.3482 60.5 1106 453.8 2.5 53.2 52.81 
6 18 0.3283 60.1 1106 453.5 2.5 53.2 52.81 
7 
1.52339 9.32 
12 0.40204 59.7 1106 453 2.5 53.2 52.81 
8 24 0.2462 64.9 1106 453.7 2.5 53.2 70.43 
9 18 0.2843 64.1 1106 453.4 2.5 53.2 70.42 
10 
1.14254 6.99 
12 0.3482 63.1 1106 453 2.5 53.2 70.42 
11 24 0.1741 102.0 1106 453.5 2.5 53.5 141.1 
12 18 0.201 97.0 1106 453.2 2.5 53.4 141.1 
13 
0.57127 3.495 
12 0.2462 91.4 1106 452.8 2.5 53.4 141.0 
 
 
For Case1, the total coolant inlet flow area is taken as 2.30965m2 which is half of 
the inlet flow area in the original ATHENA model. For cases 2 to 4, the total flow areas 
are taken equal to the total flow area through the reactor core including the bypasses. As 
seen in Table IV, the flow areas in cases 1 to 4 are close to each other. For cases 2 to 4, 
the total flow area and the amount of graphite removed are constant, but the number of 
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holes and their dimension are different. For cases 5 to 7, 8 to 10 and 11 to 13, the total 
flow areas are taken as 66.67%, 50% and 25% of total flow area through the reactor 
core.  
Column 3 of the above table shows the percentage of graphite removed from the 
outer reflector in the different cases. Column 6 shows the total vessel pressure drop for 
each case which is the sum of the pressure drop at the inlet flow path and pressure drop 
in the reactor core. Pressure drop out of the vessel is not included here. Out of these total 
pressure drops shown in column 6, about 55 KPa pressure drop occurs in the core and 
the rest of the pressure drop occurs within the inlet flow path region.  
By observing the total pressure drop in the above table (column 6) it can be 
concluded that, total core pressure drop is changed with the change of total inlet flow 
area. It can also be noted here that, the maximum velocity through core (column 10) as 
calculated by ATHENA is not substantially changed by these modification of coolant 
inlet path (except for small changes in core velocity, due to changes in the coolant 
density in the core). Therefore, for each case, the velocity through the core is almost the 
same, but the inlet velocities (column 11) are different for different inlet flow areas.  
The inlet pressure drops (not shown separately in the table) are also different due 
to different hydraulic diameters (column 5). For cases 1 to 10, the inlet pressure drop 
(column 6 minus ~55 KPa) is a small fraction of core pressure drop. As a result, with the 
change of number of holes for a constant inlet flow area, the changes in total pressure 
drop are insignificant. But for cases 11 to 13, pressure drops within the inlet section are 
high compared to the pressure drop in the core. In these cases (case 11 to 13) the change 
in the number of holes for a constant inlet flow area results a change in the calculated 
hydraulic diameter, which in turn produces a significant change in the inlet pressure drop 
and the total core pressure drop.  
The pumping power is the product of coolant volumetric flow rate and pressure 
difference. Table IV shows the pressure drop within the vessel only. The pressure drops 
within primary system but out of vessel, i.e. the pressure drop in the intermediate heat 
exchanger and in the primary system piping are not included here. We intend to keep the 
 40 
pressure drop in the vessel within ~90 KPa to limit the pumping power to within about 
3% of the total core power, which is reasonable for the MHR. Column 7 shows the 
pressure drop within the vessel for each case. We also want to limit the coolant inlet 
velocity (column 11) and coolant velocity through the reactor core (column 10) to 
approximately the same range.  
Considering all limiting criteria it can be concluded from Table IV that, with the 
removal of about 10% of graphite from outer reflector which gives a flow area of ~1.53 
m
2
, the inlet velocity would be consistent with the velocity in the core. The steady-state 
vessel temperatures shown in column 8 are not accurate; it is higher than the actual 
vessel temperature. The details modifications of the ATHENA model to predict the 
accurate vessel temperatures have not been implemented at this point and will be 
performed in the subsequent sections.  
At this point in this analysis process, the pressure drop is reasonable (~60 KPa) 
but the hydraulic diameters and the pressure drops are based on some simplifying 
assumptions regarding the number of holes and their dimensions (column 4 and 5), We 
may end up with a small different pressure drops if the number of holes in the details 
calculation (which is performed in the following sections) for the coolant inlet scheme is 
different than those in the above table. A reduced hydraulic diameter will also result in a 
higher pressure drop and vice versa. To make the inlet flow area and dimension of holes 
more specific, a closer-look to the geometry of outer permanent reflector is necessary.  
The radial thickness of outer permanent reflector is not constant throughout the 
periphery of the reactor core. It varies from about 11 inches to 6.5 inches. Out of this 
available thickness, we have to leave 1 inch at outer edge next to the core barrel for 
boronated pins. Leaving an additional inch at the inner side of the reflector for structural 
integrity, the holes for coolant flow can be made with a diameter of ~4 inches to ~9 
inches. Finally a total of 72 holes with diameters of 4 inches (10.16 cm), 6 inches (15.24 
cm) and 8 inches (20.32 cm) are selected as shown in Table V. 
 
 41 
 
TABLE V  Final Selection for Coolant Flow Configuration 
Number of Holes for each sizes Total Flow Area for 
Inlet Coolant 
(m2) 
Graphite from Outer 
Reflector Reduced by 
(%) 10.16 
cm 
15.24 
cm 
20.32 
cm 
1.6417 10.04 18 18 36 
 
 
The average area of each hole is:  
21.6417a= =0.0228 m
72
 
where  
1.6417 is the total cross sectional area of coolant flow path 
72 is the total number of holes 
From this we have the average or equivalent hydraulic diameter of 0.170386 m 
The average radial distance from the inner face of reactor core barrel to the 
center of these coolant holes is:  
 
4 ×18+6 ×18+8×36
+1 =7.5 =0.1905 m
72
′′ ′′
′′ ′′
 
where  
18 and 36 are number of holes of corresponding sizes 
4", 6" and 8" are diameter of holes 
72 is the total number of holes 
1" is thickness of permanent side graphite that is left for the boronated pins  
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D. Radiation and Conduction Heat Transfer Calculation 
 Up to now the outer replaceable reflector, PSR and core barrel were modeled as a 
single heat structure in the ATHENA model. The inlet flow is modeled at the right 
boundary (outer face) of this heat structure. Since in the physical reactor, the stagnant 
helium (the original annular passage) is on the right boundary of the core barrel and the 
inlet helium has a much higher temperature than that of the stagnant helium, this 
assumption artificially increases steady-state vessel temperature. To overcome this 
situation and calculate the vessel temperature correctly, the replaceable outer reflector, 
the PSR and the core barrel are modeled as two different heat structures. The separation 
point is 0.1905m from the inner face of the core barrel as calculated and shown above. 
This separation point is likely to be through the center of the new coolant holes and 
through the outer permanent reflector.  
Therefore, the heat structure for ‘outer reflector-inner region’ includes the 
replaceable outer reflector and a portion of the permanent side reflector. This heat 
structure uses the new coolant path as its right boundary and the bypass flow as the left 
boundary. The heat structure for the ‘outer reflector-outer region’ includes the rest of the 
permanent side reflector and the core barrel. This heat structure uses the new coolant 
path as its left boundary and the stagnant helium as the right boundary. With this 
splitting of heat structure for the outer reflector of the original ATHENA model, the new 
coolant path is modeled at its physical location in the modified ATHENA model.   
To calculate the volumetric heat capacity, the coolant holes are considered as 
homogenized throughout an annular portion of the permanent side reflector. The density 
of graphite in that portion of the permanent side reflector is reduced to account for the 
reduction of graphite and for the reduction of heat capacity of the permanent side 
reflector. These reductions were made with the percentage at which the graphite from 
permanent side reflector is reduced or removed due to the addition of these new coolant 
holes. Figure 14 shows a view of the portion of the reactor core with the location of new 
coolant holes and the new heat structure model for the outer reflector and the reactor 
core barrel to calculate the heat conduction.   
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Fig. 14. HS model for PSR and core barrel and the location of new coolant holes. 
 
 
 
Radiation heat transfer is calculated as in the original ATHENA model except for 
the radiation from the core barrel. In the original ATHENA model, the core barrel was 
an integral part of the heat structure for the outer reflector but it is included in outer 
reflector outer region in this modified model. The final modified nodalization for the 
reactor vessel system as used in this calculation which includes the new coolant path 
through outer permanent reflector is shown in Figure 15.   
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Fig. 15. ATHENA nodalization for reactor primary with modified coolant flow. 
 
 
 
The tedious part of performing the radiation heat transfer calculation is finding 
the view factors. Two restrictions are imposed for the calculation of radiation heat 
transfer.  
• The view factors from each surface to all other surfaces must sum to 1. i.e.  
 
n
im
1
F =1.0∑  
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• To conserve energy, the area times the view factor for each surface i to any other 
surface m must be equal to the area of m times the view factor from m to i. This 
restriction is known as the reciprocity rule and is expressed as:  
 
i im m m1A F =A F  
 
  The conduction enclosure model calculates heat transfer from one heat structure 
to another.  Gap conductance (G) is used to characterize the thermal connection between 
heat structures in the conduction enclosure model. If the surface node i of a heat 
structure thermally coupled to the surfaces node of m of another heat structure, then the 
conduction enclosure surface heat flux is calculated by using equation: 
 
 
i imQ=GA ∆TF  
 
where 
Q = heat transfer rate (W) 
G = gap conductance (W/m2-K) 
Ai = surface area of face i 
Fim = view factor between the heat structure i and the heat structure m, or the fraction of 
the surface area of heat structure i in contact with the heat structure m. 
 
The model can be used to simulate multidimensional heat conduction in a 
lumped parameter fashion. The gap conductance is provided for conduction enclosures. 
The gap conductance is computed as the thermal conductivity divided by the appropriate 
length. For axial conduction, the length is the distance between the heat structure 
centers. For a gap between structures, it is the spacing between the adjacent structures. 
An energy balance is performed on conduction enclosures to ensure that the model is 
working as desired. View factors to calculate heat transfer using the gap conduction 
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model are calculated and conservation of energy is evaluated using the reciprocity rule. 
All those view factors are introduced into the ATHENA model. 
 
 
E. Optimized New Coolant Scheme and Steady-State Calculation 
 With the optimized new coolant configuration the steady state calculation is 
performed first. Table VI shows the ATHENA calculated results, which include the 
steady-state vessel temperature, pressure drop, coolant inlet velocity, steady-state fuel 
peak temperature, etc for the modified coolant configuration.  As expected the pressure 
drop is increased from 56 KPa to 61.7 KPa. Since the core design is the same, the 
pressure drop across the reactor core remains the same and the additional pressure drop 
occurs in the new coolant inlet path.  
 
 
 
TABLE VI  Final Optimized Coolant Flow Configuration 
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1.6417 10.04 18 18 36 0.170386 61.7 1106 421 2.13 53.2 49.1 
 
  
The steady-state vessel temperature is reduced from ~541 0C (as shown to Table 
III) to ~421 0C. Due to this reduced vessel temperature the heat loss through the reactor 
vessel wall to the RCCS is also reduced from ~4.5 MW (as shown in Table III) to 2.13 
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MW. Up to this point, all calculated parameters from the ATHENA analysis are found to 
be within acceptable range.  
A further reduction of vessel peak temperature below 421 0C while keeping the 
coolant inlet temperature as high as 590 0C, is not likely. Therefore, a reduction of vessel 
temperature during normal operation by reducing the coolant inlet temperature will be 
evaluated in the following chapter. The transient calculation for this modified coolant 
scheme discussed in this chapter will be followed by that task.   
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CHAPTER V 
OPTIMIZATION OF NEW CORE DESIGN 
 
A. Block Design of MHR 
 The MHR consists of a number of hexagonal graphite blocks. Each block has a 
side length of 0.207827 m. Each block has a total of 216 holes for control rods, where 6 
holes are filled with burnable poison rods. In the current graphite block design 10 fuel 
rods are accommodated in a row between two opposite sides of a hexagonal block. This 
design is referred as 10 row block design. For the case with 12 fuel rods in a row 
between two opposites side of the graphite block, the design is referred as 12 row block 
design.  
With the current graphite block core design, the maximum ∆T across the reactor 
core would be ~360 0C3. Due to this limiting criterion, for MHR calculations in Chapter 
IV, the core inlet temperature was set to 590 0C for a core outlet temperature of 950 0C. 
The inlet coolant temperature is one of the main determinants of the steady-state vessel 
temperature. For a constant core outlet temperature, with the reduction of core inlet 
temperature, the total mass flow rate is decreased to conserve the reactor power. Due to 
this reduced mass flow rate, the overall Reynolds number is reduced which results in 
reduced forces convection heat transfer from the fuel rod surfaces to the primary coolant. 
Since the coolant temperature is the convective boundary for a sub-channel in the core, 
the reduced heat transfer results in higher fuel centerline temperatures for the same 
coolant temperatures. 
For a constant coolant hole centerline temperature the fuel surface temperature 
decreases with the decrease of both coolant hole diameter and thickness of graphite 
between fuel rod and coolant hole. Also, for a constant fuel surface temperature the fuel 
centerline temperature decreases with the decrease in fuel rod radius.  
The reactor inlet and outlet temperatures of 590 0C and 950 0C respectively 
correspond to a vessel temperature of 541 0C which is reduced to 421 0C by the 
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alternative coolant scheme through the PSR as discussed in Chapter IV. The peak vessel 
temperature needs to be reduced to ~350 - 360 0C to use standard LWR vessel material 
for the MHR vessel material. 
The purpose of this part of the study is to verify different block designs and 
optimize the design modification to allow an increased ∆T across the reactor core and 
reduce the coolant inlet temperature while keeping the coolant outlet temperature as high 
as 950 0C, and maintaining the PFCT during normal operation within ~1250 0C. The 
reduced inlet temperature will result in a reduced PVT during normal operation.  
The modifications and optimizations of block fuel-element and the fuel rods 
design have been performed. The dimensions of fuel rods, coolant holes and triangular 
pitch have been changed. The thermal properties for new fuel rods have been calculated 
and new inlet boundary conditions have been introduced using thermal hydraulic codes. 
The peak vessel temperature and the peak fuel centerline temperature have been 
calculated with all these modifications. The transient response for the MHR with this 
new block core design has been calculated and compared to that of the original design.  
 
B. POKE and ATHENA Calculations for GT-MHR 
 In addition to RELAP5-3D/ATHENA code, the POKE19 thermal hydraulic code 
which was developed at General Atomics is used for this modification. POKE is used to 
optimize the peak fuel centerline temperature and RELAP5-3D/ATHENA is used to 
calculate the steady-state peak vessel temperature and to evaluate the transient behavior 
of the MHR with the modified reactor core and the graphite blocks design.  
 POKE computer code was developed at GA for simplified and steady state 
thermal hydraulic analysis of MHR. In the POKE analysis, the reactor is assumed to 
consist of a number of regions, each containing parallel coolant channels connected to a 
common inlet and outlet plenum. Figure 16 shows the layout of the core used in the 
POKE model. 
 The core is designed with 120-degree symmetry and the control rods are also 
operated symmetrically. Due to this symmetry one third (34 columns) of the core is 
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modeled. Each column consists of an upper reflector, active or fueled section and a 
lower reflector. POKE can calculate the steady-state coolant mass flow, pressure drop, 
coolant and moderator temperature, fuel temperature distribution, etc, for this MHR. A 
precise temperature distribution from fuel centerline to the bulk coolant temperature is 
possible to calculate using the POKE model. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 16.  GT-MHR core layout for POKE analysis.9 
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 As discussed in Chapter IV, the RELAP5-3D/ATHENA model includes inner 
reflector, active core, upper and lower reflector, outer reflector, core barrel, vessel wall, 
RCCS, etc. On the other hand, the POKE model includes the active core and upper and 
lower reflector only. Before the RELAP5-3D/ATHENA and POKE models are used for 
this modification, some other significant differences in modeling and calculation 
between these two models are discussed.  
 The equivalent thermal analysis models for the reactor core used in the POKE 
and ATHENA analyses are not the same. Figure 17 shows the equivalent annular model 
used in RELAP5-3D/ATHENA to represent the hexagonal sub-channel and a triangular 
element of a unit cell used for the thermal analysis in POKE. For each region, the 
thermal analysis model of POKE uses an average coolant channel that is coupled to an 
adiabatic unit cell. For the prismatic fuel block, the unit cell is a right triangular element 
containing one third of the area of a fuel compact and one sixth the area of the coolant 
hole.  
In ATHENA, a coolant channel is coupled with a hexagonal sub-channel as 
shown in Figure 17. In both calculations, the coolant channel temperature is used as a 
boundary condition for convective heat transfer. Fuel and moderator temperatures are 
calculated based on that. For the same bulk coolant temperature both models will predict 
exactly the same temperature difference between bulk coolant temperature and fuel rod 
centerline temperature.  
The results of the calculations from these two codes for identical input boundary 
conditions are compared with each other and are verified. Due to different analysis 
models and different output parameters, direct comparison of some of the parameters is 
beyond our scope. The inlet temperature, pressure, bypass flow, etc, are set the same, 
and the power distributions are set identical into both models. The calculated results 
from one code such as mass flow rate, flow distribution, temperature, pressure drop, etc, 
are compared with the corresponding results from the other code. 
POKE can be run in several modes depending on the user’s interest or boundary 
conditions specified. In this study, the coolant flow rate, inlet pressure and temperature 
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are specified. The POKE model is used to calculate the flow distribution, and the 
temperature of the coolant, fuel and moderator at each axial location for each column. In 
addition, POKE calculates the maximum fuel centerline temperature, maximum 
moderator temperature, maximum fuel surface temperature, and core average 
temperature for the fuel and moderator.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
a) Equivalent annular model of hexagonal 
sub-channel in ATHENA 
b) Triangular element of a hexagonal sub-
channel used for thermal analysis in POKE 
 
 
Fig. 17.  Thermal analysis model used in ATHENA and POKE models. 
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The power distribution is the key input for reactor analysis using both the POKE 
and the ATHENA codes. The POKE model uses a comparatively more detailed power 
distribution. The ATHENA model which is capable of transient analysis is not capable 
of calculating fuel centerline temperature precisely since the power distribution used for 
the ATHENA calculation is averaged for all columns in the same ring. ATHENA also 
calculates the volume average temperature of fuel. The user can specify whether 
moderator will be included or excluded to calculate the volume average temperature.  
In this study, the ATHENA model is run with both options to calculate the 
volume average temperature of fuel including and excluding the graphite moderator in 
the core. Using the number of fuel rod in a standard, control and reserve shutdown 
assembly, the volume fractions of fuel and moderator in each graphite block in the inner 
ring, middle ring and outer ring are calculated. Using those volume fractions and the 
volume average temperature calculated by ATHENA, the volume average temperatures 
of fuel and moderator are calculated and compared with the corresponding temperatures 
calculated by POKE.  
Table VII shows the comparison of some of the parameters in the POKE and 
ATHENA analyses for the original block (10-row block element) reactor core design. 
Using the ATHENA model the thermal power loss to the RCCS is calculated and the 
reactor power in the POKE calculation is reduced to account for heat losses to the 
RCCS.    
The core average temperatures of fuel and moderator calculated by POKE are 
shown in Table VII. The volume average temperature for fuel calculated in ATHENA 
and the volume average temperature of moderator calculated from ATHENA results are 
also shown. The core average temperatures of fuel and moderator in ATHENA and in 
POKE are close. The difference in peak fuel centerline temperature is mainly due to the 
different power distributions used in the two models. In addition, the equivalent thermal 
analysis model, thermal conductivity and bypass flow model used for POKE and 
ATHENA analyses are different.  
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TABLE VII  ATHENA and POKE Results with Original Block Design 
Temperature 
0C 
Core Average 
Temperature, 0C 
Code used 
Intel Outlet 
Bypass 
Flow 
∆P 
KPa 
Fuel Mod 
PFCT  
0C 
ATHENA 590 950 0.1 56 914.2 896.8 1108 
POKE 590 950 0.1 59.7 926 875.9 1207 
   
 
 
 
POKE assumes the thermal conductivity of the fuel and moderator are 
temperature independent but ATHENA uses temperature dependent correlations for the 
thermal conductivity of materials, including fuel and moderator. There are also 
significance differences in the way bypass is modeled in ATHENA and POKE model. In 
ATHENA bypass flow is only calculated through inner and outer reflectors. The 
hydraulic diameters of the flow paths through the reflectors are tuned to get a certain 
fraction of flow as bypass flow. In the POKE model, the inner and outer reflectors are 
not modeled. Therefore, all bypass flow is considered through the active core in POKE 
model, and the user can specify (1) the fraction of bypass flow to the total mass flow and 
(2) the ratio of bypass temperature rise to average core temperature rise in the core.  
The POKE model uses a friction factor that corresponds to smooth pipe. The 
ATHENA model uses wall roughness of 1.51E-5 m, which also corresponds to the 
roughness of a smooth pipe. The small difference in pressure drop across the reactor core 
as calculated by the POKE and ATHENA models are due to the differences in modeling 
assumptions as discussed. In addition, both models include entrance and exit loss 
coefficients, and orifice loss coefficients, but ATHENA model does not include offset or 
internal loss coefficients which are included in the POKE analysis.  
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C. Bypass Flow Optimization 
The original ATHENA model assumed 10% of bypass flow, while previous 
POKE calculations used 20% bypass flow. In this study the same bypass flow is used for 
both POKE and ATHENA analyses. A sensitivity study is performed to calculate the 
influence of the bypass flow on the fuel and moderator temperatures.  
A similar study was done in the past considering a constant ratio (0.3) of 
temperature rise of the bypass flow to the average temperature rise of the core flow3. In 
the present study the bypass is varied from 8% to 22% and the ratio of temperature rise 
of the bypass flow to the average core temperature rise is calculated. The calculation 
shows that with 10%, 15% and 20% bypass flow, the fraction of power removed by the 
bypass flow would be 3.45%, 4.78% and 6%, respectively, and the ratios of bypass 
temperature rise to the average core temperature rise would be 34.5%, 31.8% and 30%, 
respectively. Figure 18 shows the variation of fuel centerline temperature with bypass 
flow. For an inlet temperature of 590 0C, the peak fuel centerline temperatures (PFCT) 
with 10%, 15% and 20% bypass flows are found to be 1206 0C, 1231 0C and 1260 0C, 
respectively. 
 
 
1180
1200
1220
1240
1260
1280
1300
0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.2 0.22
Bypass flow
Pe
ak
 
Fu
el
 
Ce
n
te
 
Li
n
e 
 
Te
m
p,
 
 
0 C
 
Fig. 18. Variation of PFCT with the variation of bypass flow. 
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The axial and regional power peaking factors provided by GA are used for this 
study. A 15% of bypass flow (instead of 10% in previous ATHENA analyses and 20% 
in previous POKE analyses) is used for the rest of the analyses using both POKE and 
ATHENA codes. The calculations also show that the core average fuel and core average 
moderator temperatures increase with the increase in bypass flow.  
 
D. New Core Design; Calculation and Optimization 
1. Design Optimization 
The calculation for the new graphite block core design for the MHR is performed 
and the design is optimized.  The graphite block dimension is remained unchanged. The 
numbers of fertile and fissile particles in a single graphite block as well as in the entire 
core in the 10 row fuel block element design are considered as a reference and are 
conserved in the new design. From the manufacturing point of view, the fuel rod radius 
can not be less than 1 cm. For structural integrity, the minimum web thickness (i.e. the 
thickness of graphite between fuel rod and coolant hole) would be 0.45085 cm. The 
pressures drop needs to be maintained within acceptable limits during this optimization. 
In addition, PFCT and PVT both need to be within allowable ranges during normal 
operation and under transient conditions.  
The original 10-row element core design is compared with a new 12-row element 
core design in Table VIII.  The numbers of fuel rods, coolant holes, and their 
dimensions, etc., are presented for a standard assembly, control assembly and for a 
reserve shutdown assembly. The ratio of total graphite to total fuel volume in the core is 
increased from 3.147 to 3.72. Since the fuel rod radius is reduced from 0.00635 m in the 
10-row block core design to 0.005 m in the 12-row block design, the volume of fuel 
compact is reduced from 0.00126 m3 to 0.0011 m3. The number of fuel compacts and the 
number of fuel particles per fuel compact are assigned in such a way that the total 
number of fuel particles in the core of the new design is conserved.  
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TABLE VIII  Block Design Parameters 
Parameters 10 Row Block 12 Row Block 
 Standard Control RSC Standard Control RSC 
Number of fuel rods 210 186 186 300 266 266 
Number of large coolant holes 102 88 88 147 128 128 
Number of small coolant holes 6 7 7 6 7 7 
Fuel rod radius (m) 0.00635 0.005 
Large coolant hole radius (m) 0.0079375 0.0063115 
Small coolant hole radius (m) 0.00635 0.005 
Block side length (m) 0.207827 
Minimum web thickness (m) 0.0045085 
Triangular pitch (m) 0.018796 0.01582 
Number of assembly/layer 72 12 18 72 12 18 
Graphite/fuel area 2.9973 3.4576 3.4508 3.5639 4.053 4.1468 
Graphite/coolant hole area 3.8061 4.4501 4.5577 4.4506 5.0015 5.229 
Fuel/Coolant area 1.2698 1.2872 1.2872 1.2488 1.261 1.261 
Flow area (m2) 0.02095 0.01830 0.01830 0.01887 0.01657 0.01657 
Graphite/fuel area; entire core 3.1473 3.724 
Fuel max temp 1231.3 1199.9 
Coolant maximum temp 1126 1123.8 
Fuel compact volume (m3) 0.00126 0.0011 
Number of fuel compact 3126 4460 
Fissile particle/compact 4310 3021 
Fertile particle/compact 520 364 
Fissile volume fraction 0.17166 0.19619 
Fertile volume fraction 0.02786 0.03184 
Matrix volume fraction 0.39 0.39 
Shim volume fraction 0.41048 0.38197 
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2. Thermal Properties for Fuel Rod 
The thermal properties for the fuel rod in the new core design have been 
calculated and are used in both the POKE and ATHENA analyses. Using the available 
correlation20 the temperature dependent thermal conductivity for the fuel rod is 
calculated. The correlation is developed from curve fit of experimental data where in 
addition to fuel temperature, the shim and matrix volume fractions are considered of the 
thermal conductivity for the fuel rods.  
In ATHENA, as mentioned before, the fuel rods are modeled as an equivalent 
annular ring, where the thickness of fuel rod in the equivalent model is less than the 
actual radius of the fuel rod. Therefore, the thermal conductivity of fuel is reduced by an 
appropriate factor to achieve the same temperature rise across the fuel rod. Like other 
thermal hydraulic analyses21 for the high temperature reactor, a comparison of the exact 
solution for the temperature rise across a cylinder to the exact solution for the 
temperature rise across an annular ring with an outer adiabatic surface is considered to 
calculate this factor. For this calculation this factor is found to be 0.37.  
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Fig. 19. Thermal conductivity of fuel. 
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Figure 19 shows the calculated thermal conductivity and the thermal conductivity 
used in the ATHENA model for the fuel rod in the new core design having 12-row fuel 
element. The thermal conductivities of the fuel rods in the original 10-row block core 
design are also shown in the figure. Since POKE uses a constant (i.e. temperature 
independent) thermal conductivity, a thermal conductivity which corresponds to a 
temperature of 1250 0C (close to the maximum fuel temperature) is used for the POKE 
calculation as it had been used in the previous calculations.  
The specific heat capacity (Cp) of the fuel rods in the new block design is also 
calculated using the available correlation20. According to the correlation, the temperature 
dependent Cp is calculated as a function of shim volume fraction. Using the density for 
the each of the fraction of the fuel compact (fuel particles, shim and matrix etc.), the 
overall density for fuel rod and then the volumetric heat capacity (ρCp) are calculated for 
use in the ATHENA analysis. Figure 20 shows the specific and volumetric heat 
capacities for fuel rods in both designs as a function of temperature. As shown in the 
figure the specific heat capacity of the new fuel is reduced by about 2.2%, but due to a 
small increase of density, the volumetric heat capacity remains about the same as the old 
design.   
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Fig. 20. Specific and volumetric heat capacity of fuel. 
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3. Radial Temperature Distribution 
The radial temperature distribution at the hottest channels for a 10 row and 12 
row block design with same inlet boundary conditions are shown in Figure 21. For the 
same power and the same inlet/outlet temperatures, the peak fuel centerline temperature 
is reduced by ~32 0C for the new design. The temperature drop from the fuel centerline 
to the fuel surface in the 12 row block fuel is reduced due to smaller rod diameter, even 
though the thermal conductivity of the new fuel rod is reduced by about 2.5%. The total 
temperature drop from the fuel centerline to the bulk coolant temperature is also reduced 
due to smaller fuel rod and smaller coolant hole diameter.  
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Fig. 21. Radial temperature distribution at hot channel. 
 
 
 
4. Inlet Temperature Optimization  
The parameters corresponding to the new block design such as fuel rod heated 
perimeter, coolant hole hydraulic diameter, number of equivalent channel in standard 
assembly, control assembly and in reserve shutdown assembly have been calculated and 
incorporated into the POKE calculation. With this new block core design, the fuel 
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centerline temperature is reduced from ~1231.3 0C to ~1200.0 0C for the same inlet 
temperature of 590 0C. Therefore, the inlet temperature can be reduced to reduce the 
steady-state vessel temperature while keeping the PFCT within acceptable limit.  
There is a one-to-one relationship between the core inlet temperature and the 
coolant mass flow rate for a constant reactor power. Using several combinations of inlet 
temperatures and mass flow rates, the POKE calculations are performed to optimize the 
PFCT. Figure 22 shows the PFCT for different inlet conditions. This calculation shows 
that the core inlet temperature can be reduced from 590 0C to 510 0C while maintaining 
the PFCT below 1250 0C (for a 510 0C core inlet temperature the peak fuel centerline 
temperature is 1247.5 0C). The corresponding mass flow rate is reduced to 265.24 
kg/sec. It should be noted here that the reactor power used in this POKE analysis is 
obtained by subtracting the RCCS loss from the total actual reactor power.  
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Fig. 22. Variation of PFCT with inlet temperature. 
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E. Steady State Calculation for New Block Design 
Using the new inlet coolant temperature the steady-state calculations for the new 
design reactor have been performed using both POKE and ATHENA codes. The axial 
temperature distributions in the hottest channel are shown in Figure 23. The axial 
distribution of fuel centerline, fuel surface, fuel gap, graphite surface and bulk coolant 
temperatures are shown for a 12 row block design.  
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Fig. 23. Axial temperature distribution in the hot channel. 
 
 
 
Several combinations of axial and column power distributions have been used to 
optimize the new block design. The baseline refueling scheme assumes that at the 
beginning of an equilibrium cycle one half of the core consists of fresh fuel and other 
half of the core consists of old fuel. The power distribution is flattened by using an 
appropriate fuel placement scheme. In this case each column consists of both fresh and 
old fuel at the beginning of an equilibrium cycle.  
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Fig. 24. Column and axial power distributions used for sensitivity study. 
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The axial power distribution used in this sensitivity study includes a distribution 
derived from the detailed core power distribution provided by GA. For other axial power 
distributions, an axial shape, cosine axial shape and bottom peak axial power distribution 
provided by GA have been used. Figure 24 shows the axial and column power 
distributions used for these sensitivity studies.  
As shown in the figure, both the baseline refueling and fuel placement column 
power distributions result in the shifting of the peak power from the inner ring to the 
middle and outer rings. All axial power distributions shown in the figure are close to a 
cosine distributions except the bottom peak distribution which provides the maximum 
fuel centerline temperature of ~1349.5 0C.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 25. Fuel temperature distribution as a function of fuel volume fraction. 
 
 
600
700
800
900
1000
1100
1200
1300
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Volume Fraction
Fu
el
 
Te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
, 
0 C
Column Refueling
Simulate Fuel Placement
1200
1220
1240
1260
1280
1300
0 0.0025 0.005 0.0075 0.01
Volume Fraction
Fu
el
 
Te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
, 
0 C
Column Refueling
Simulate Fuel Placement
 65 
Figure 25 shows the fuel temperature distribution as a function of fuel volume 
fraction for both types of column power distributions. A zoom for the small fuel volume 
fraction having the highest temperature has been included in the picture. For column 
refueling distribution, the maximum fuel centerline temperature is below 1250 0C, but 
for simulate fuel placement distribution the peak fuel temperature is 1282 0C and about 
0.5% of total fuel volume operates at higher than 1250 0C.  
The ATHENA model has been modified to represent the new graphite block core 
design. The new input boundary is set as already mentioned. The hydrodynamic model 
representing the active core, bypass flow, flow through upper and lower reflector, etc, 
has been modified. The heat structure model for the active core, upper and lower 
reflector, and the gap conduction enclosures model for axial and radial heat transfer 
during the transient have been modified in the ATHENA model to account the new 
graphite block core design in the ATHENA analysis.  
Table IX below compares the POKE and ATHENA calculated results for the 
new block core design with all the above mentioned changes incorporated. Form this 
table, it can be seen that, with the new block design for an inlet temperature of 510 0C 
the steady-state vessel temperature is reduced to ~369 0C while the fuel peak centerline 
temperature is at or below 1247.5 0C.  
 
 
   
 
TABLE IX  ATHENA and POKE Results with Modified Block Design 
Temperature
0C 
Core Average 
Temp, 0C 
Code 
Intel Outlet 
Bypass 
Flow 
 
Mass 
Flow 
kg/sec 
∆P 
KPa 
Fuel Mod 
PFCT 
0C 
Vessel 
Temp, 0C  
POKE 510 950 0.15 265.24 59.5 888.5 846.6 1247.5 ---- 
ATHENA 510 950 0.15 265.24 56.0 878.8 859.5 1138.5 ~369 
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The pressure drop for this inlet boundary condition and for the new core design 
as calculated by ATHENA is same as that for the previous design. The hydraulic 
diameter of the coolant hole is reduced from 0.79375 cm in a 10 row block design to 
0.63115 cm in a 12 row block design. The expected additional pressure drop in the 
ATHENA calculation for this reduced hydraulic diameter is offset by the decreased mass 
flow rate and increased bypass flow.  
 
 
 
F. Back Calculation for a Vessel Temperature of 350 0C 
Up to this point, the peak vessel temperature calculated during steady-state is 
reduced to 369 0C.  However, our goal is to reduce the vessel temperature to ~350 0C -
360 0C as mentioned before. To evaluate the possibility of achieving this ultimate goal, a 
backward calculation is done by fixing the peak vessel temperature at 350 0C for steady-
state operation. The ATHENA calculation shows that with the alternative coolant flow 
path and the new core design, the inlet coolant temperature needs to be reduced to 482 
0C (∆T across the core is 468 0C) to achieve this reduced peak vessel temperature. This 
inlet temperature corresponds to a mass flow of 249.4 kg/sec. Since the peak fuel 
centerline temperature is influenced by the amount of bypass flow, different bypass 
flows are used for this analysis. Our goal is to maintain the fuel centerline temperature 
within acceptable limits while maintaining the vessel temperature at 350 0C.  
Figure 26 shows the fuel temperature as a function of fuel volume fraction for 
different power distributions and for different bypass flows with a vessel temperature of 
350 0C at steady-state operation.  A zoom of this figure shows that for a 10% of bypass 
flow, only about 0.2% of fuel volume is above 1250 0C and the peak fuel centerline 
temperature is 1265 0C. With 15% bypass flow and the simulated fuel placement 
distribution, the peak fuel centerline temperature is 1303.3 0C and only about 0.85% of 
fuel volume operates at higher than the expected operating temperature of 1250 0C.  
Form this figure, one can conclude that if it is possible to limit the core bypass 
flow to 10% of the total core flow, then with the alternative coolant flow configuration 
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through outer reflector and the modified 12 row block design, the vessel temperature can 
be reduced to 350 0C while maintaining the peak fuel centerline temperature below 1250 
0C.   
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Fig. 26. Fuel temperature distribution as a function of fuel volume fraction for different 
power distributions and different bypass flows. 
 
 
 
 
Until this point, all of the PFCTs for the new core design occur at the control 
assemblies or at the reserve shutdown assemblies (instead of the standard assemblies) 
where the number of sub channels has been reduced to accommodate the control rods. It 
should be noted here that, in the original POKE model, only four columns (column 
number 2, 3, 7 and 8) out of a total of 34 columns were modeled as control assembly, 
and no reserve shutdown assemblies were considered. The power distribution was 
provided accordingly.  
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In this analysis, a total of ten columns (column number 3, 4, 8, 9, 14, 20, 24, 28, 
30 and 34) out of a total of 34 columns are modeled as either control or reserve 
shutdown assemblies. This change in the POKE model is made to provide consistency 
between the POKE model and the actual core layout as discussed at the beginning of this 
chapter and is shown in Figure 16. It also provides consistency between the ATHENA 
and POKE models. The ATHENA model assumed that the number of control assemblies 
and reserve shutdown assemblies are 12 and 18 respectively for the entire reactor core. 
In terms of sub channels per assembly, the reserve shutdown assembly and control 
assembly are identical. In both RELAP3-D/ATHENA and POKE models, the numbers 
of equivalent sub-channels in a standard and control (or reserve shutdown) assemblies 
are 105.84 and 92.48  respectively for a 10 row design, and 150.77 and 132.39 
respectively for a 12 row design.  
The column power distribution used for this analysis is based on four control or 
reserve shutdown assemblies for a one third of the reactor core. Therefore, the additional 
six control or reserve shutdown assemblies has power factor that correspond to standard 
assembly, even though the number of sub channels is reduced for all control and reserve 
shutdown assemblies. As a result, the power factors per sub channel for those six control 
and reserve shutdown assemblies are higher than it is supposed to be. Due to this 
inconsistent power distribution, these additional six control assemblies predict higher 
PFCT than actual PFCT.  
During PFCT calculation, one of these control assemblies is hitting the maximum 
allowable fuel temperature limit prior to the standard assembly, even though the 
corresponding power factor for that particular control assembly is not the highest one. 
As a result, due to these inconsistent power distributions, both the PFCT and peak vessel 
temperature as calculated so far are over predicted. Both the PFCT and PVT are likely to 
be possible to reduce further.    
Table X shows the PFCT for different bypass flows and for different power 
distributions. The PFCTs are shown separately for standard assembly and for control 
assembly. It shows that for a bypass flow of up to 15%, the PFCT remains at or below 
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1240 0C for all standard assemblies with a vessel temperature of 350 0C which 
corresponds to coolant inlet temperature of 482 0C, and a mass flow rate of 249.3 kg/sec. 
Even for 20% bypass flow, during the simulate fuel replacement distribution, the PFCT 
is within the limit for standard assemblies, but during baseline refueling distribution, it is 
~1276 0C.  
Table X also shows that, for a same bypass flow, the PFCT for standard 
assembly is reduced from ‘Baseline Refueling’ to ‘Simulate Refueling’ as expected. 
Considering the PFCT of control assemblies (column 3 of Table X) for which we don’t 
have appropriate power distribution, the results are different.  
For cases 1, 3 and 5, with baseline refueling power distribution, all PFCTs in the 
standard assembly occur at assembly number 25 for which the power factor is 1.32. 
However, all PFCTs in the control or reserve shutdown assemblies (which is higher than 
the PFCT of standard assembly) simultaneously occur at assemblies number 14 and 20 
where the power factors are 1.19 for both assemblies. 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE X  PFCT for a PVT of 350 0C 
Case 
No. 
Bypass 
flow 
Power Distribution PFCT for Control 
Assembly, 0C 
PFCT for Standard 
Assembly, 0C 
SC + RSC 
assemblies 
1 10% Baseline Refueling 1233 1209 10 
2 10% Simulate Replacing 1269.4 1147 10 
3 15% Baseline Refueling 1265 1240 10 
4 15% Simulate Replacing 1303.3 1175 10 
5 20% Baseline Refueling 1301.5 1275.9 10 
6 20% Simulate Replacing 1342 1207 10 
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An additional investigation was undertaken to determine whether a further 
reduction of coolant inlet temperature is possible by modifying the block design. The 
fuel rod dimension can not be reduced anymore from the manufacturing point of view. 
Keeping the fuel rod dimension same while reducing the coolant hole diameter may 
allow us to reduce the peak fuel centerline temperature. The results of the investigation 
showed that the reduction of coolant hole diameter to reduce the peak fuel centerline 
temperature is not feasible.  
Since the diameter of the fuel rod and the number of fuel rods are not changed, 
with the reduction in coolant hole diameter the pitch is not decreased significantly. 
However the web thickness is increased with the reduction of coolant hole diameter 
since the graphite block dimension is not changed. Calculations for this revised design 
show that, a reduction in coolant hole radius from the current radius of 0.63115 cm to 
0.5 cm will result a reduction of the peak fuel centerline temperature by only 5 0C, but 
the pressure drop across the reactor core is increased by about a factor of three. 
With the revised coolant flow path through the PSR, it may be challenging to 
prevent any unexpected flow through the annular region between the reactor core barrel 
and reactor vessel wall or through the boxed channel in this region. Therefore, an 
investigation was undertaken to calculate the influence of leakage of hot inlet helium 
through the annular path and the boxed channel regions.  
Figure 27 shows the vessel temperature rises during normal operation caused by 
the unexpected helium flow through the annular path between reactor vessel wall and the 
reactor core barrel. An inlet coolant temperature of 510 0C which corresponds to a vessel 
temperature of 369 0C is considered for this investigation. The figure shows that a flow 
of 2% of the inlet helium flow rate through the annular path or through the boxed 
channels which corresponds to mass flow of ~5 kg/sec of the inlet helium flow rate, 
results in a vessel temperature rise of ~40 0C. Therefore, even a small leak of inlet 
helium through the annular region needs to be carefully addressed to prevent an 
excessive vessel temperature rise.   
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Fig. 27. Vessel temperature as a function of leak through annular path between reactor 
core barrel and reactor vessel wall. 
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CHAPTER VI 
TRANSIENT ANALYSIS OF MHR 
 
During normal operation of a MHR the helium coolant takes heat from the 
reactor core. The hot helium then transfers heat to the power conversion system (PCS) 
and/or the intermediate heat exchanger (IHX). When the reactor is in a shutdown 
condition, the Shutdown Cooling System (SCS) removes residual heat from reactor core. 
This heat is removed by the shutdown heat exchanger which is located below the core. 
Eventually the heat is rejected to atmosphere through the shutdown cooling water 
system.  
If the reactor is scrammed and SCS fails to remove heat from reactor core, 
conduction cooldown events occur and decay heat then is removed from the core 
passively by RCCS. Two important types of accidents for the MHR are a High Pressure 
Conduction Cooldown (HPCC), which may also be referred to as the loss of coolant 
flow accident, and a Low Pressure Conduction Cooldown (LPCC), which may also be 
referred as loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). The transient response of the MHR for the 
original design configuration, the alternative coolant flow path configuration and the 
final modified design with both the alternative coolant scheme and the new graphite 
block core design are analyzed for these two conduction cooldown events and discussed 
below.  
The reactor vessel peak temperature response and the fuel peak temperature 
response were evaluated for both the HPCC and LPCC transients. For both cases the 
reactor is scrammed at the beginning of the transient. The initial conditions for these 
transient cases were taken from the steady-state operating condition. During an LPCC 
the loss of helium coolant and the resultant coolant pressure decrease occurs at a rate that 
depends on the size of the break. For this LPCC calculation, a rapid depressurization of 
the reactor primary system from steady-state primary pressure to atmosphere conditions 
in about 50 seconds is assumed. This rapid depressurization corresponds to large break 
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in the primary system. In reality, if the break is smaller and the depressurization occurs 
slowly, then additional convective cooling of the core will occur due to the continued 
presence of helium in the primary system. Therefore, the fuel and vessel peak 
temperatures for a smaller break will be less than those predicted in these calculations.  
During this transient the reactor is scrammed and the core power quickly drops to 
decay heat levels. The helium is also rapidly exhausted from the primary system, so the 
only way for the decay heat to be removed from the reactor core is by conduction and 
radiation through the reactor vessel wall to the RCCS. During the transient, the graphite 
absorbs a large amount of heat due to its very high volumetric heat capacity. By 
removing graphite from the reactor for the new coolant configuration, we essentially 
remove a portion of the total volumetric heat capacity. Therefore, in the modified design, 
the reactor will result higher vessel peak temperature during transient due to reduced 
amount of graphite.  
For a HPCC, the reactor is scrammed and the forced (pumped) flow to the reactor 
core is lost, but the helium remains in the primary system and only a small drop in 
primary system pressure is experienced. In this case, a gradual depressurization of 
primary system pressure to about 5 MPa over a period of about 50 hours is assumed. 
PVTs during a LPCC and HPCC events for the original reactor design configuration, the 
reactor design configuration with the alternative coolant scheme (ACS) and the reactor 
design configuration with both the ACS and the new 12 row block core design are 
shown in Figure 28. For the original reactor configuration (Base Case) the outlet 
temperature is 850 0C and for the rest of the cases the outlet temperature is 950 0C.   
Since the pressurized helium promotes heat transfer by natural circulation in the 
HPCC transient, the PVT is lower for the HPCC when compared to that for the LPCC as 
shown in Figure 28. The calculated PVT for the original ‘Base Case’ is ~500 0C for 
LPCC transient and it occurs at about 82.8 hours from the beginning of the transient. 
With the modified coolant configuration the PVT is found to be 510 0C for LPCC 
transient and it occurs at approximately 74 hours after transient initiation. This increased 
PVT occurs because of the reduction of graphite in the core to accommodate the 
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alternative coolant scheme. The PVT during the LPCC for the new block core design is 
reduced from that for the ACS but it is approximately the same that for the original base 
case because the graphite-to-fuel volume ratio in the new block core design is increased.  
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Fig. 28. PVT during LPCC and HPCC transients. 
 
 
 
For the HPCC transient, the PVT is increased from ~467 0C to ~478 0C from the 
original design to the new coolant scheme due to the reduction of graphite, but the PVT 
is reduced in the third case where we use the alternative coolant scheme and the new 
block core design simultaneously, since the graphite-to-fuel volume ratio is increased as 
described above. During normal steady-state operation and at the beginning of the 
transients, the PVT occurs in the bottom part of the reactor vessel. But during transient 
this PVT occurs at about the middle of vessel. All calculated PVTs are found to be 
within acceptable limits during the transients.  
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Peak fuel temperatures during the LPCC and HPCC transients are shown in 
Figure 29 for original design case for the modified coolant scheme and for the new block 
core design. For the original design, the calculated peak fuel temperature is 1438 0C and 
it occurs about 62 hour after the transient is initiated. The calculated PFT for the reactor 
having ACS is 1471 0C which is higher than that for the original design case. This 
increased PFT is again the result of the removal of graphite moderator from PSR. The 
calculated PFT during a LPCC for the MHR having both the ACS and new block core 
design is 1438 0C and occurs about 62 hour after the transient is initiated.  
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Fig. 29. PFT during LPCC and HPCC transients. 
 
 
 
During the HPCC transient the calculated PFT for original base case, the MHR 
design with the ACS and MHR with both the ACS and the new graphite block core 
design are 1277 0C, 1327 0C and 1324 0C, respectively. All of these vessel and fuel peak 
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temperatures are consistent with other thermal analyses for MHR, and are well below the 
specified design limits.  
The results of these transient analyses are also summarized in Table XI. For the 
MHR having both the ACS and the new graphite block core design not only the graphite 
fuel volume ratio is increased from the previous cases but also the amount of helium in 
the reactor system is reduced due to the reduced mass flow rate. This reduced volume of 
helium has significant role in case of HPCC transients.  
During normal operation the PFT occurs at the bottom of the reactor core for 
each of the power distributions. The mass flow rate and the hydraulic diameter are 
constant throughout the channel length but the viscosity is increased with the increase in 
temperature as the fluid flows from top to the bottom of the core. As a result, the 
Reynolds number in a particular channel is reduced from the top to the bottom of the 
core, and the convective heat transfer rate is also decreased. Therefore, even with the 
higher heat fluxes in the middle portion of the core for an axial cosine power 
distribution, the bottom end of the fuel rods will have higher temperatures.  
 
 
 
TABLE XI  Transient Analyses for MHR 
LPCC HPCC 
PFT PVT PFT PVT 
Case 
Temp 
0C 
Time 
hr 
Temp 
0C 
Time 
hr 
Temp 
0C 
Time 
hr 
Temp 
0C 
Time 
hr 
Original Design 1438 62.1 499.6 82.8 1277 60.6 466.8 73.0 
New Coolant Scheme 1471 65.1 510 74 1327 54.7 478.1 67.5 
New Coolant Scheme + 
New Block Core Design 
1438 70.6 500.0 82.8 1324 58.7 474.2 76.8 
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During transients, the location of PFT is determined by the axial and radial 
power distributions, especially for the LPCC since there is no helium flow. For an axial 
cosine power distribution, the PFT will be at the middle (axially) of the inner ring for the 
LPCC. For the HPCC transient, the location of the PFT will shift upward and will be 
located approximately 6 volumes from the bottom of the core due to upward natural 
circulation of helium through reactor core during the transient.  
The decay power distribution and the heat loss through the reactor vessel to the 
RCCS during these transient are shown in Figure 30 for the MHR having both the ACS 
and the new graphite block core design. The steady-state heat loss to the RCCS for the 
original base case design was above 3 MW and is reduced to below 2 MW due to the 
reduced vessel temperature. The maximum RCCS losses during the calculated transients 
are 2.1 MW for the LPCC and 2.21 MW for the HPCC, which occur approximately 81 
and 75 hours, respectively, after transient initiation.   
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Fig. 30. RCCS power and decay power during transient. 
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CHAPTER VII 
RELIABILITY AND AVAILABILITY STUDIES 
 
Various quantitative and qualitative techniques may be used to assess the 
reliability and availability of process systems, system equipment and system 
manufacturing operations. The interactions of equipments, systems and personnel that 
have potentially undesirable consequences may be identified by these techniques.  
For reliability and availability analyses of the coupled nuclear hydrogen 
production plant, these undesirable consequences include plant shutdown, excessive 
downtime, production of hydrogen with some undesired mixture in the final product, etc. 
These incidents reduce the system reliability and availability as well as the system 
profitability by decreasing the production and increasing the maintenance cost. The fault 
tree analysis technique is used to define the particular process or equipment failures that 
will result in these incidents of concern.   
The probabilistic risk analysis consists of five steps22; these are accident 
frequency analysis, accident progression analysis, source-term analysis, offsite 
consequence analysis and risk calculation. Also there are three levels of PRA. A Level 1 
PRA consists of accident frequency analysis and risk calculations. A Level 2 analysis 
consists of a Level 1 PRA, accident progression analyses and source term analyses. A 
Level 3 analysis consists of all five steps of analyses i.e. it includes Level 2 PRA and 
offside consequence analyses. Since the Level 1 PRA includes risk analysis, each 
subsequent level of PRA analysis includes the risk calculation in its results.  
The Level 1 PRA mainly deals with accident frequency. For example, in case of 
nuclear power plant, the Level 1 PRA calculates the core damage frequency. Accident 
sequences and their groups are identified in the Level 1 PRA and these accident 
sequence groups are used as an input for the Level 2 PRA. The scope of the present 
study encompasses a portion of the Level 1 analysis, where the failure probability of the 
system is calculated. A PRA analysis of the complete nuclear hydrogen production 
 79 
process would include the hydrogen production plant, Brayton cycle power conversion 
system and the modular helium reactor, along with all the support subsystems and 
piping. These developed models of hydrogen production plants are considered as the part 
of a complete PRA model for coupled nuclear hydrogen production process. Risk 
analysis for this portion of PRA model is not desirable instead the focus will be 
concentrated on evaluating the reliability and availability of the hydrogen production 
plants. 
Since the reactor provides heat for the hydrogen production plants, the failure of 
the hydrogen production plants will result in complete or  partial loss of heat removal 
capability (loss of load) for the nuclear reactor. In this circumstance, some action might 
be needed for the nuclear reactor to avoid any undesired consequences or upset 
condition. From an availability standpoint, it is desired that as long as the reactor is in 
operation, both hydrogen production plants will also be operating. If for some reason the 
reactor is in the shutdown condition, say for component replacement or routine 
maintenance, required and routine maintenance would be done simultaneously for the 
hydrogen production plants. For this coupling between nuclear reactor and the hydrogen 
production plants, an increased concern is sustained about how reliable the hydrogen 
production plants compared to the reactor. To address this concern, a reliability and 
availability assessment of the hydrogen production plants has been performed.  
This study includes the calculation of the reliability and availability of both hydrogen 
production plants. The results of this study will help to determine whether design 
improvements are required to improve system reliability, and what improvements 
(system/component redundancies, etc.) will be most beneficial. The models developed 
for this study can also be used to analyze the risk increase and risk reduction ratios as 
well as other factors influencing individual component and entire system reliability . 
Since reliability and maintainability studies for the MHR have already been 
performed and reported10, maintainability analyses for the SI and HTE-based hydrogen 
production plants will not be performed. Instead, it is assumed both plants will follow 
the same maintenance schedule as the reactor. 
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A. SAPHIRE Code 
 SAPHIRE23 stands for ‘System Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated 
Reliability Evaluation. The previous version of this PRA code is IRRAS (The Integrated 
Reliability and Risk Analysis System). The IRRAS code was developed at the INL 
under the sponsorship of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the U.S. 
Department of Energy (DOE). The development of IRRAS was started because of a 
recognized need for microcomputer based software to aid the task of probabilistic risk 
assessment. The initial scope of this code development was to provide software that 
could show the feasibility of using microcomputers for performing probabilistic risk 
analysis.  
The IRRAS code was developed with the capabilities of providing certain 
essential functions such as fault tree construction, failure data input for basic events, cut 
sets generation, cut sets quantification, etc. The very first version of the SAPHIRE code 
was developed at the INL with the same capabilities as IRRAS, but included 
improvements in the Graphical User Interface (GUI) and the option to run the code in 
Windows 95 and Windows NT. Further improvement and development of the SAPHIRE 
code has continued to make this code more powerful and more user-friendly. 
SAPHIRE refers to a set of several microcomputer programs with the capability 
of creating and analyzing probabilistic risk assessments for both nuclear and non-nuclear 
systems but was developed primarily to analyze the nuclear power plants. The SAPHIRE 
code can be used for fault-tree analysis, event tree analysis, cost-benefit analysis, 
balancing risks and benefits in situations involving human safety, environmental risks, 
and financial uncertainties. It can also be used for the evaluation of the effectiveness of 
emergency systems, accident prevention, accident mitigation, and for the assessment of 
radioactive releases to the environment.  
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B. SAPHIRE Model Development 
Both the SI thermochemical and HTE based nuclear hydrogen production 
processes use the MHR as the heat source. To complete the reliability study of the entire 
nuclear hydrogen production process, PRA models for both the SI thermochemical and 
the HTE-based nuclear hydrogen production plant need to be developed. The reliability 
code which is capable and commonly used to analyze nuclear system need to be used for 
the reliability studies for these plants. The code selected for this development effort is 
the SAPHIRE code, which was described in the previous section. 
The SAPHIRE code is not commonly used for the analysis or assessment of 
chemical plants since it was primarily developed for nuclear power plant analyses. 
However, since both the hydrogen production plants are coupled to the MHR system, the 
SAPHIRE code has been used to perform these reliability and availability studies with 
the aim of having a complete model in future for the entire nuclear hydrogen production 
process. 
The capabilities of the code were more than adequate to meet most of the needs 
for our analysis of the nuclear hydrogen production processes.  The one area that 
presented a unique challenge was the closed loop component dependencies inherent in 
the hydrogen production processes.  These closed loop component dependencies are the 
result of a lot of recycling of materials in the hydrogen production process flow sheets. 
SAPHIRE has been used by nuclear industries to analyze systems which are open loop 
or once through in nature. This code can not be used to analyze a system having closed 
loop component dependency unless the system is modeled as an equivalent open loop 
system for fault tree analysis in the SAPHIRE model. In case of closed loop component 
dependency in the fault tree model, the code will run for ever without generating and 
displaying the output. Therefore, the fault tree model developed in this study used 
equivalent open loop system for model development and analysis.   
For this study, fault tree models are first developed for both the HTE and SI-
based hydrogen production processes. Using information obtained on system 
configuration, component failure probability, component repair time and system 
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operating modes and conditions, the system reliability and availability are assessed in the 
next step. Required redundancies are made to improve system reliability and to optimize 
the plant design for economic performance. Due to these redundancies, the failure rates 
and outage factor of both nuclear hydrogen production processes are reduced to an 
acceptable range which is essential for high efficiency nuclear hydrogen production 
using Modular Helium Reactor.  
 
C. Failure Data 
1. Failure Data Description 
Component failure is defined as the incapability for a component to perform its 
required functions24.  A critical failure causes immediate and complete loss of a system’s 
capability of providing its output. A failure which is not critical but which prevents the 
system from performing its function within specifications is a degraded failure. This type 
of failure may develop into a critical failure in time. Therefore, degradation of the ability 
of an item to perform its required work may also be considered as failure. Another class 
of failure is incipient failure. A failure, which does not immediately cause loss of a 
system’s capability of providing its output, but which, if not attended to, could result in a 
critical or degraded failure in the near future is referred to as an incipient failure.  
The failure data considered here includes complete failure of the item, partial 
failure of the item and failure of the part of the item that causes unavailability of the 
system or a part of the system. Incipient failure is not included in these analyses. Since 
there will be an option for an emergency maintenance during plant operation and the 
entire nuclear hydrogen production process will have a routine maintenance schedule, 
incipient failure may not result in a complete failure of the system if the incipient failure 
conditions are recognized and addressed during normal scheduled maintenance.  
The total failure data for any equipment may be a combination of both time 
dependent and demand related failures. However, all equipment considered for these 
analyses are operating equipment and their demand is continuous. Therefore, all failure 
data used for these analyses are time dependent. The failure rate for each basic event (i.e. 
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each component) is the combination of ‘failure during operation’ and ‘failure due to 
maintenance’. The fractional contribution for each of these two failure modes to the total 
failure rate is not provided separately to the code.  
For all equipment, the mode of operation was chosen as running mode, or 
continuous mode or operation mode provided that the data was available. Data for 
standby equipment were not considered since all our equipment are in continuous 
operation and not standby. For pumps, all data were selected for centrifugal pumps and 
was classified according to the pump size and type of fluid. For heat exchangers, all data 
were taken for Tube-Shell heat exchangers and the data was classified according to the 
type of fluid in the primary side and secondary side. Data for the power recovery 
equipments were classified by size and type of fluid. The data for vessels were classified 
based on the function and size of the vessels.  
 
 
2. Selection of Calculation Type 
 There are 17 different calculation types in SAPHIRE numbered 1 through 9, T, 
F, I, S, G, L, M and H. The calculation type is a numerical reference to the calculation 
that represents the way the failure data of the component will be treated. For some of the 
calculation types the failure rate of the basic events is directly used by the code as the 
basic event failure probability. Different calculation types are used for non-repairable 
component, repairable component and for standby components. Based on our mission, 
available component types in the SAPHIRE and the developed model, the following 
three calculation types were used for these calculations: 
• Calculation type 3 
• Calculation type 5 
• Calculation type T & F 
 
Calculation type 3 is the full equation for the failure probability of an operating 
component without repair in a non-demand failure mode. All components in the 
hydrogen production flow sheets are operating component and this calculation type was 
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used for the initial calculation or during the intermediate step of the analysis to 
determine the failure probability or failure frequency of the component and the plant. 
Results of this initial calculation were used to optimize the plant flow sheet and 
component specification. Even though this calculation type is appropriate for non 
repairable components only, it was used for the preliminary analysis to determine the 
comparative failure contribution of different components. Once the component sizing 
and plant optimization was completed, this type was no longer used for the final step of 
the analysis. The equation used for this calculation is: 
-λtP=1-e  
 
where 
P = failure probability 
λ = failure rate (per hour or per specific number of hours) 
t = mission time expressed in hours, the default 24 hour mission time is used.  
 
Calculation type 5 is the full equation for the failure probability of an operating 
component with consideration given to the ability to repair the component in a non-
demand failure mode. For components in the hydrogen production flow sheets this 
calculation type is used for the final calculation to evaluate the unavailability of the plant 
for the given mission time. For this calculation one year is used as a mission time. The 
equation used for this calculation is: 
 
 
1
- λ+ t
τλτP= . 1-e
1+λτ
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
where 
P = failure probability 
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λ = failure rate (per hour or per specific number of hours) 
τ = average time to repair expressed in hour 
t = mission time expressed in hours, one year (8760 hours) mission time is used.  
 
Calculation types T and F are used for the components that are not physically 
included in the hydrogen production plants but are used in the SAPHIRE model as the 
complement component for the model development. These components are used to 
provide more modeling flexibility for the users. Both the T and F type of calculation are 
house events where T is used to represents the component as a ‘failed component’ and F 
is used to represent the component as a ‘successful component’. Events that are defined 
as either T or F calculation type do not appear in the cut sets. The failure probability of T 
and F type components are 1.0 (100% failed) and 0.0 (100% success), respectively.   
 
D. Data Sources and Data Selection 
There are no large-scale existing commercial plants for hydrogen production. So 
data for equipment based on historical site experience in a commercial hydrogen 
production plant is not possible. All data used for this study were from the databases 
from industries other than nuclear hydrogen production. From a number of available 
reliability data sources, the mean failure probability for each component, its mean repair 
time and uncertainty of these data are studied. Reliability data for a particular component 
from different data sources are compared and the most relevant ones are incorporated 
into the SAPHIRE analysis. Some data may have been misinterpreted, since the system 
configuration from with the data was obtained may not be same as the system 
configurations in our analyses.  
The Offshore Reliability Data (OREDA24) covers reliability data from a wide 
range of equipment used in oil and natural gas exploration and production industries. 
Offshore topside and sub sea equipment as well as some onshore exploration equipment 
are also included. The major data source for the European Industry Reliability Data 
Bank (EIReDA25) is the reliability database of the probabilistic safety assessment of the 
 86 
nuclear power plants in France. It includes failure rates of electric motors recorded by 
seven European utilities. In addition, it includes reliability data for electric transmission 
grids, distribution grids, electric stations, components etc.  
The Process Equipment Reliability Data26 by the Center for Chemical Process 
Safety (CCPS) of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers accumulated and 
aggregated data from a variety of plants and industries, such as nuclear power plants, 
chemical process industries, offshore petroleum platforms, etc. ‘Reliability Data of 
Components in Nordic Nuclear Power Plants (T-book27)’ provides reliability data for 
components used in Swedish nuclear power plants. This data book includes only critical 
failures (i.e., failures that stop component functions and require immediate repair). 
Another data source that has been used for these analyses is ‘The Reliability Data 
Handbook28’.  
These five data banks were used to develop reliability data for individual 
components in each of the nuclear hydrogen production process flow sheets. From the 
above-mentioned five databases, failure data for each component have been studied and 
compared. The data that best matched the individual component specifications and 
description were selected for these analyses.  
In those cases with high system or component failure rates, possible 
redundancies were examined to improve the system reliability. In addition, to address 
common cause failures several references were consulted to obtain data on common 
cause failure29-30 probabilities. In those cases where common cause failure data could not 
be found, 10% of the total failures were considered to be common cause failures as a 
thump rule which is consistent with other similar studies.  
An example of a fault tree (or sub tree) which includes common cause failure 
probability, and was used to calculate component redundancies is shown in Figure 31. 
The similar sub tree is used for any redundancy that is used in the fault tree model for 
both SI thermochemical and HTE based plant. Component TE104 which is a ‘Turbine 
and Liquid Expander’ is taken as an example.  
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BS-TE104
IND-TE104
2.036E-3
TE104-A
2.036E-3
TE104-B
2.036E-4
TE104-CCF
Liquid Expander
 BS-TE104  -   Bottom Liquid Expander 2005/06/28 Page 42
 
Fig. 31. Fault tree for common cause failure. 
 
 
 
The failure probability of this component is 2.03E-3 which is considered high 
and a redundancy is recommended. Therefore, another TE104 component is added with 
an AND gate IND-TE104. The AND gate calculates the simultaneous failure probability 
of both liquid expanders (i.e. TE104). Therefore, the AND gate IND-TE104 fails if both 
components (i.e., both liquid expanders) fail simultaneously for independent reasons. If 
there is a common cause that results in the simultaneous failure of both turbines, that 
failure mode is included through component TE104-CCF which is connected to IND-
TE104 with an OR gate BS-TE104. So the top gate of this sub tree BS-TE104 will fail if 
either both the expander fails for independent reason (IND-TE104 fails) or both of them 
fails simultaneously for a common cause (TE104-CCF fails). For a pump this common 
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cause may be low frequency power from same source. In the following example the 
common cause failure probability (2.03E-4) is considered as 10% of component’s 
independent failure probability (2.03E-3). In absence of common cause component 
TE104-CCF, the calculated failure probability will be less than the actual one.  
 
E. Fault Tree Analysis 
A fault tree is a model of a system which is suitable for reliability analysis. The 
model is usually tailored for the study of system failures. A system can be represented 
graphically or logically. The fault tree is the graphical representation of the system, but a 
developed fault tree for the system can be easily converted to a logical representation. 
Both the fault tree graphic and logic can be thought of as a group or set of equations 
which describe the possible failure combinations in the system.  
Solving the fault tree includes generating cut sets for the selected fault tree based 
on cut sets generation cut off values. The SAPHIRE fault tree model is capable of 
generating cut sets for a selected fault tree or group of fault tree or all fault trees within 
the current project. The cut sets is the combination of events leading to system failure. 
Three cut set generation cut off values can be specified such as: 
• Cut off by cut sets probability 
• Cut off by event probability and 
• Cut off by size or zone.  
 
For a cut off by cut set probability, two options can be selected. For the ‘global’ 
option, only those cut sets whose product for all its events probabilities is greater than or 
equal to the magnitude in the ‘global cut off value’ field are considered. The numerical 
value in the field of the ‘global cut off value’ is a user defined value; if no value is 
defined the SAPHIRE code will continue calculation with a default value.  
For the ‘cut off by event probability’ option the minimum cut off value for events 
is provided and  all events having failure probability less than that minimum cut off 
value are removed from the calculation. If the cut off by size is selected, then all cut sets 
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whose number of events is equal to or less than the provided cut off value are kept and 
all other cut sets are removed from the result.  
 
 
1. Quantifying the Fault Tree 
 The fault tree quantifying process includes:  
• Re-quantifying the cut sets using current data values 
• Re-quantifying the cut sets using minimum cut sets upper bound approximation 
• Re-quantifying by adding together the probabilities for the cut sets of the top 
event 
• Re-quantifying using the exact calculation for the union of cut sets via the 
inclusion and exclusion rule 
 
The widely used minimum cut sets upper bound approximation method of 
calculation approximates the probability of the union of the minimum cut sets of the 
fault trees. The mathematical equation for the minimum cut sets upper bound 
approximation is: 
 
m
iS=1-(1-C )  
  
where  
S = minimum cut sets upper bound for the fault tree unavailability 
Ci = probability of the ith cut sets 
m = number of cut sets 
 
The Min Max method of quantification quantifies the current case cut sets using 
the exact probability quantification algorithm. To determine the minimum and maximum 
quantification, the ‘number of pass’ is provided by the user at the beginning. The 
number of passes is the number of the intermediate terms SAPHIRE will calculate when 
determining the maximum and minimum values.  
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2. Uncertainty Analysis 
Failure data for basic events are statistical data and are incomplete without the 
information on the uncertainty of each data set. Due to this uncertainty in the basic 
events probability, the variability of SAPHIRE results such as cut sets generation need to 
be calculated. SAPHIRE uses two sampling techniques to do this uncertainty analysis: 
Monte Carlo simulation and Latin Hypercube simulation. SAPHIRE samples the user 
specified distribution for each of the basic events in a group of cut sets then quantifies 
these cut sets using the sample values. 
The Monte Carlo simulation is a fundamental and widely used uncertainty 
sampling approach. To perform the sampling following this simulation process, the 
SAPHIRE code makes repeated quantifications of the fault tree (or sequence or end 
state) cut sets using samples from the basic events uncertainty distributions. This type of 
simulation requires more samples than Latin Hypercube simulation. The Latin 
Hypercube simulation is a stratified sampling technique where the random variable 
distributions are divided into equal probability interval. Generally the Latin Hypercube 
simulation requires fewer samples than the Monte Carlo simulation for similar accuracy, 
but due to the stratification method, it takes a longer time to complete the calculation.   
 Both the probability distribution and the cumulative distribution plots can be 
generated by the SAPHIRE code. The uncertainty of failure data for each of the 
components in the two hydrogen production plants is collected and is added to the 
developed SAPHIRE model. A probability distribution based on the Monte Carlo 
simulation is presented for each plant in the corresponding chapter.  
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CHAPTER VIII 
SAPHIRE ANALYSIS OF SULFUR IODINE PLANT* 
 
The development of the Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) model for the Sulfur-
Iodine thermochemical based nuclear hydrogen production process is the initial step in 
performing the reliability, availability and maintainability studies, and for economic 
analysis of the plant. This chapter will discuss the development of the SAPHIRE model 
for the SI plant, the performance of the reliability and availability studies, the use of 
component redundancies for the improvement of system reliability, and optimization of 
the plant design.  
The system was modeled based on three-coupled chemical reactions for 
hydrogen production using the Sulfur Iodine (SI) process as shown and discussed in 
Chapter I. To develop a SAPHIRE model of this hydrogen production chemical plant, a 
master fault tree is first developed which represents these coupled chemical reactions. 
The system configuration and component information for this model was obtained from 
General Atomics Report GA-A24285, Revision 1, dated December 2003.  
The model was developed to the level of detail at which sufficient information 
and data existed to reflect the performance of the hydrogen production chemical plant. 
The analysis included only those components that correspond to specific functions in the 
chemical hydrogen production process. Therefore, the model assumes no failure of the 
hydrogen production process happens due to failures of heat supply from the reactor, 
power supply for the process plant and distilled water supply to the system. All these 
additional sub-systems can be added to the model in the future. The development of the 
PRA model includes:  
• Familiarization with the hydrogen production chemical plant 
• Identification of the fault tree top events for this plant 
________________________ 
*Part of the study reported in this chapter is reprinted with permission from “An Evaluation of Reactor 
Cooling and Coupled Hydrogen Production Processes Using Modular Helium Reactor,” by E. A. 
HARVEGO, S. M. M. REZA, M. B. RICHARDS, A. S. SHENOY, 2006, International Journal of 
Nuclear Engineering and Design, Vol. 236, pp. 1481-1489. Copyright 2006 by Elsevier. 
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• Delineate systems and system boundaries 
• Delineate systems and system boundaries 
• Specify model assumption and specify conditions for the failure of the system 
• Construct fault trees 
• Collection of failure data for each component  
• Analyze model, generate cut sets, optimize the result and perform checks as 
needed.  
 
The SAPHIRE model developed for the SI plant has been used to calculate the 
plant failure frequency or the number of hours the plant will be out of service due to 
component failures within a specified mission time. Different ways to improve the 
reliability of the plant were also identified during this analysis.  
 
A. The SAPHIRE Model Development for SI Plant 
To develop the SAPHIRE model, the fault tree top event for the coupled 
chemical reaction was first identified. The complete SAPHIRE model that includes all 
three sections of the SI hydrogen production process was then developed in several 
steps.  In the first step, models for each of the three main reaction sections of the SI 
process were developed assuming single components for each of the functions identified 
in the flow sheets. In the second step, these models were modified to include multiple 
components to perform each different function, according to the number of component 
for each function provided in the earlier referenced GA report.  
The complete SI based hydrogen production plant consists of four individual 
plants. Each plant provides one fourth of total hydrogen production capacity of the plant, 
and utilizes all the heat from one 600 MWt MHR. Therefore, a total of four MHRs are 
used to provide heat to four separate hydrogen production plants. At the beginning of 
this work, the flow sheet development for each individual section of the plant was not 
completed to the level needed for the development of SAPHIRE model. Therefore, some 
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assumptions were made in the initial development stages of the SAPHIRE model. Based 
on those assumptions, the failure modes of the system were defined. 
In addition, since the number, type and capacity of individual parallel 
components listed in the General Atomics report are developed for cost estimating 
purposes only, and do not necessarily represent the final system design required to meet 
system reliability and availability requirements, adjustments are made to the number of 
parallel components to provide consistency across individual sections. 
Since there are four completely independent hydrogen production plants 
connected with each MHR, the total numbers of components in the entire system are 
selected to be divisible by four. Therefore, as an example, if 40 components are 
identified to perform a particular function, 10 of these components are associated with 
one MHR supplying heat to one hydrogen plant that provides one-fourth of the total 
hydrogen production.  
For some cases, this assumption results in more than one component at a single 
location for a single function. The number of component provided for a single function, 
therefore, varies from one to ten for a single independent plant providing one-fourth of 
the total hydrogen production capacity. From the available information in the SI process 
flow sheets, it is sometimes difficult to predict the effect of the failure of some of the 
component on the whole process. In case we have multiple components for a single 
function at a single location, total capacity of these equipments is greater than the 
required capacity for the relevant function. Therefore, one of the decisions is made 
during the SAPHIRE model development is that the failure of one parallel component 
does not necessarily result in a system failure.  As a result, the total capacity of some 
components operating in parallel is 25% more than the required total capacity.  
Therefore, as an example, with five components in parallel, failure of one component 
does not lead to a system failure, but the simultaneous failure of two or more parallel 
components may cause either failure or degradation in the system performance.  This 
approach allows for a degree of redundancy while at the same time preserving the 
numbers of components specified in the earlier referenced GA Report.  
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Many discussions with researcher form GA/INL working on the development 
and modification of these hydrogen production plants have been performed to resolve 
those confusions that arose during this model development. An alternative model also 
has been developed and analyzed considering number of every component or equipment 
is one instead of 5 or 10. So a comparative study is possible to figure out how the 
probability of failure for the complete H2 process plant changes if one large component 
is replaced by corresponding several small components.  
Since the flow sheet development and modification was not complete at the 
beginning of this model development and further modification was continued 
simultaneously with the development of this SAPHIRE model, any modification that has 
been done for flow sheet or for those components by the time of this analysis has been 
included in this model. The developed SAPHIRE models at the first and second steps 
were used as the basis for the present final model development but those initial and 
intermediate models are not included for this final analysis. 
The initial model was used to optimize the size and specification of many 
components. As the development of the final flow sheets progressed, a refined 
SAPHIRE model was developed in the third and final steps for a representative SI plant 
having a hydrogen production capacity equal to one fourth of the total hydrogen 
production capacity. Figure 32 shows the master fault tree for the SI thermochemical 
plant.  
The master fault tree has four transfer gates, each connected to house events with 
an AND gate. The very first transfer gate corresponds to the product hydrogen 
purification process. The other three transfer gates of this fault  tree link to the individual 
fault trees for each of the chemical reaction sections in the SI process (i.e., the Bunsen 
reaction section, the H2SO4 decomposition section, and the HI decomposition section). 
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Fig. 32. Master fault tree model for SI thermochemical plant. 
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Fig. 33. Fault tree for Bunsen reaction process. 
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In the next step, the fault trees for all three sections of chemical reactions were 
developed. Figure 33 shows the fault tree for the Bunsen reaction process. The transfer 
gate in the master fault tree which corresponds to the Bunsen reaction process has the 
same name as the top event for the Bunsen reaction fault tree. 
The master fault tree, when linked to the individual fault tree for each of the three 
separate chemical reactions, provides the basis for evaluating and improving overall 
plant reliability, and assessing plant availability based on component failure rates and 
mission times. The system configuration, flow sheet and specifications for each of the 
components are also obtained from the referenced GA report. 
The fault tree model for the Bunsen reaction process has 22 transfer gates, but 
unlike the master fault tree, these transfer gates are not connected to house events by an 
AND gate. Each of the transfer gates corresponds to another fault tree or sub tree. 
Therefore, to explain the Bunsen reaction process elaborately, each of these extended 
fault tree and sub tree need to be added and explained which is not reasonable 
considering the total space requirement and the existence of complexity to represent 
such an entire system in a report. The fault tree models for hydrogen iodide 
decomposition section and for the sulfuric acid decomposition section also has many 
transfer gates. Each of the transfer gates correspond to another fault tree or sub tree. A 
sub tree may have a transfer gate again and so on.  
The complete SI process and HTE process are represented by the extended fault 
tree with all the sub trees included.  The complete model for the sulfur iodine based 
thermochemical plant consists of 27 fault trees, 115 sub-trees and 274 basic events.  The 
Fault Tree models for Bunsen reaction section were discussed here as an example for the 
rest of the system. The complete SAPHIRE models for the SI plant which includes the 
Bunsen reaction section, hydrogen iodide decomposition section and sulfuric acid 
decomposition section are provided to GA/INL.  
The complete SAPHIRE model consists of several sub sections. The boundaries 
for each sub-section are defined as part of the overall model development effort. These 
modeling boundaries used for the SAPHIRE analyses do not necessarily correspond to 
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the boundaries of the three sections in the SI process (i.e., Bunsen, HI decomposition, 
and Sulfuric Acid decomposition sections).  The basis for establishing the modeling 
boundaries is system dependency on components for failure.  
The SAPHIRE model for Bunsen process included all equipment associated with 
the Bunsen process (Section 1) flow sheet. It also includes some components from 
H2SO4 decomposition (Section 2) and HI decomposition (Section 3) flow sheets. The 
basis for selection of system modeling boundaries is the significance of the failure of a 
particular component on each section. For example, failure of component TE303 in the 
HI decomposition section affects the Bunsen reaction process much more than it does 
the HI decomposition process. Similarly, components TE301, TE302, TE303, E307, 
E308, E309 and C303 in the HI decomposition section are modeled as part of the 
Bunsen reaction process because their failure would have the greatest impact on that 
section. For the same reasons, components TE201, E209, E210, E211, E213 and P203 in 
the H2SO4 decomposition (Section 2) flow sheet are included in the Bunsen reaction 
process model.  
The SAPHIRE model is developed to provide the maximum modeling flexibility 
for the future users of this model. The house events in the master fault tree are provided 
to allow users to analyze each of the sections in the process flow sheets separately or 
together.  In addition, through the ‘Generate’ option in the SAPHIRE code, various 
sections of the SI plant can be analyzed separately or together.  Using ‘Generate’ the 
following modeling options can be exercised: 
• The complete SI plant 
• The complete SI plant except hydrogen iodide section 
• The complete SI plant except Bunsen reaction section 
• The complete SI plant except sulfuric acid decomposition 
• Hydrogen iodide section only 
• Bunsen reaction section only 
• Sulfuric acid decomposition plant only 
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B. Data Collection and Selection for Component of SI Plant 
Following development of the SAPHIRE, five data sources (mentioned in the 
previous chapter) are evaluated to collect failure data for each major component. The 
failure data considered for this analysis included critical failures and degraded failures.  
Incipient failures, however, are not considered.  The collection and comparison of data 
from these five sources for each of the components in the SI based hydrogen production 
plant is included in Appendix A.  
 
C. Calculation for SI Plant 
Table XII shows the cut sets results for the SI based thermochemical plant. From 
a total of 1857 cut sets, the first 22 cut sets shown in the table account for about 94% of 
total failures. Column 4 of the table shows the failure contribution for each of the 
components defined in the GA flow sheets, and column 3 represent the percentage 
contribution for each of the component failures to the total failure rate of the system. 
Column 2 is the cumulative failure contributions of components. These results show that 
the unavailability of the SI based thermochemical plant for a one year mission time is 
0.02212, i.e., during a year the total number of hours the plant will be out of service due 
to component failures and repair time is about 193 hours or about 8 days.  
As expected, as shown on Table XII, rotating or dynamic equipment like 
turbines, pumps, etc., have the highest failure rates and are the highest contributors to the 
overall system failure rate. These results indicate that the total failure probability of the 
SI plant is considerably higher than that expected for the economic nuclear hydrogen 
production using this plant. Therefore, further improvements in the SI hydrogen 
production plant reliability are needed. Different ways to improve the reliability of the 
plant are also identified during this analysis.  
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TABLE XII  Cut Set for SI Based Hydrogen Production Plant 
 
Sort/Slice Cut Set Report 
Project : SI_PLANT                     Fault Tree: SI-PLANT               
Min Cut Upper Bound:  2.212E-002                                                Units: Not Specified 
 
Cut No. % Total % Cut Set Prob./Frequency Cut Sets 
1 14.11 14.11 3.120E-003 TE101, Turbine/Expander 
2 23.32 9.21 2.035E-003 TE103, Turbine/Expander 
3 32.53 9.21 2.035E-003 TE104, Turbine/Expander 
4 41.74 9.21 2.035E-003 TE201, Turbine/Expander 
5 50.94 9.21 2.035E-003 TE301, Turbine/Expander 
6 60.15 9.21 2.035E-003 TE302, Turbine/Expander 
7 69.36 9.21 2.035E-003 TE303, Turbine/Expander 
8 72.08 2.72 5.995E-004 P302, Pump 
9 74.79 2.72 5.995E-004 P203, Pump 
10 77.14 2.35 5.181E-004 TE102, Turbine/Expander 
11 79.04 1.91 4.201E-004 C201-A 
12 80.49 1.44 3.183E-004 S201 
13 81.93 1.44 3.183E-004 S202 
14 83.38 1.44 3.183E-004 S203 
15 84.82 1.44 3.183E-004 S205 
16 86.27 1.44 3.183E-004 E202-F1 
17 87.71 1.44 3.183E-004 E202-F2 
18 89.15 1.44 3.183E-004 E202-F3 
19 90.60 1.44 3.183E-004 E202-F4 
20 91.74 1.15 2.522E-004 S204 
21 92.80 1.06 2.330E-004 S101 
22 93.81 1.01 2.226E-004 S102 
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To reduce the overall system failure probability, additional redundancies need to 
be incorporated into the hydrogen production plant design, particularly for those 
components that are large contributors to the overall system failure probability. 
Therefore, different redundancies and design improvements and enhancements for the SI 
plant were continued using the SAPHIRE code to optimize the plant design and achieve 
higher hydrogen production efficiencies.  
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE XIII  Cut Set for SI Based Plant with Redundancies for Seven Number of 
Components 
Sort/Slice Cut Set Report 
Project : SI_PLANT                                                                      Fault Tree: S-I-PLANT               
Min Cut Upper Bound:  8.547E-003                                                 Units: Not Specified 
 
Cut No. % Total % Cut Set Prob./Frequency Cut Sets 
1 7.02 7.02 5.995E-004 P302-A 
2 14.04 7.02 5.995E-004 P203-A 
3 20.11 6.07 5.181E-004 TE102-A 
4 25.03 4.92 4.201E-004 C201-A 
5 28.76 3.73 3.183E-004 S201 
6 32.49 3.73 3.183E-004 S202 
7 36.22 3.73 3.183E-004 S203 
8 39.95 3.73 3.183E-004 S205 
9 43.68 3.73 3.183E-004 E202-F1 
10 47.41 3.73 3.183E-004 E202-F2 
11 51.14 3.73 3.183E-004 E202-F3 
12 54.86 3.73 3.183E-004 E202-F4 
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From column 4 of Table XII, it is apparent that the first seven components are 
responsible for about 70% of the total system failures. The next three components also 
have somewhat higher contributions to the overall system failure rate compared to the 
remaining components in the table. Therefore, redundancies for components are 
incorporated into the SAPHIRE model in two steps. In the first step, redundancies for 
first seven components of the above table are incorporated into the SAPHIRE model. 
Table XIII shows the resulting cut sets with these seven redundancies. In this table, only 
the first twelve cut sets out of a total of 1864 cut sets are shown.  
The unavailability of the plant with these seven redundancies is 0.008547 for a 
mission time of one year. Therefore, the plant is likely to be out of service due to 
component failure and repair for an accumulated time of about 74 hours (a little more 
than three days) in a year. With redundancies included for the first eleven components, 
shown in Table XIV, the overall system unavailability is reduced to 0.009.  It can be 
seen from the table that, first 12 components have failure probability close to each other 
and may not be reasonable to use further component redundancy to improve the system 
reliability more.  
A single model is developed with the capability to perform all of the calculations 
described above. The model is developed in such a way that during a code run, the user 
can specify whether the model will be run without redundancy or with a specific number 
of redundancies. A separate calculation for each of the main chemical reaction sections 
is also possible with this model. For example a separate calculation for the Bunsen 
reaction process will give a total of 513 cut sets. Similar calculations for the hydrogen 
iodide and sulfuric acid decomposition sections are also possible to separately evaluate 
with this final developed model.  
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TABLE XIV  Cut Set for SI Plant with Redundancies for Eleven Numbers of 
Components 
 
Sort/Slice Cut Set Report 
Project : SI_PLANT                                                                 Fault Tree: SI-PLANT               
Min Cut Upper Bound:  6.638E-003                                             Units: Not Specified 
 
Cut No. % Total % Cut Set Prob./Frequency Cut Sets 
1 4.80 4.80 3.183E-004 S201 
2 9.60 4.80 3.183E-004 S202 
3 14.40 4.80 3.183E-004 S203 
4 19.20 4.80 3.183E-004 S205 
5 24.00 4.80 3.183E-004 E202-F1 
6 28.80 4.80 3.183E-004 E202-F2 
7 33.60 4.80 3.183E-004 E202-F3 
8 38.40 4.80 3.183E-004 E202-F4 
9 43.11 4.71 3.120E-004 TE101-CCF 
10 46.91 3.80 2.522E-004 S204 
11 50.43 3.52 2.330E-004 S101 
12 53.78 3.36 2.226E-004 S102 
 
 
 
To verify the results of this modeling effort, additional calculations such as the 
minimum cut set upper bound approximation, min/max quantification, importance 
analysis, etc., were performed to check for inconsistencies in the analyses. Results from 
those calculations are not included here considering the goal and mission of these 
studies. However, the results of a fault tree uncertainty analysis without any redundancy 
are presented in Figure 34.  This uncertainty analysis is based on Monte Carlo sampling, 
with uncertainty data for each component provided to the SAPHIRE model. Figure 34 
shows the plot of probability distribution including relevant statistical values; a trial run 
of 5000 was used for this uncertainty analysis.  
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Fig. 34. Uncertainty analysis: Probability distribution for SI plant model. 
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CHAPTER IX 
SAPHIRE ANALYSIS OF HTE PLANT 
 
The development of the Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) model for the High 
Temperature Electrolysis (HTE) process is important in order to perform reliability, 
availability and maintainability studies, and economic analyses of the HTE based 
nuclear hydrogen production process. This work is one component of a complete PRA 
model for the entire nuclear hydrogen production process that should ultimately be 
developed. This chapter will discuss the development of PRA model, reliability and 
availability studies performed, improvements to system reliability and optimization of 
the plant design for the HTE based nuclear hydrogen production process. The SAPHIRE 
model includes the HTE plant and the Brayton cycle power conversion system. 
The fault tree model for the HTE based nuclear hydrogen production plant is first 
developed and then the reliability and availability of the system are assessed. The 
availability includes the estimation of the expected number of total hours or days the 
plants will be out-of-service due to component failures during a specified mission time. 
For most cases the mission time is a year. These studies also evaluate component 
redundancies to improve and optimize the plant design for improved economics and 
reliable operation of nuclear hydrogen production process. The HTE based hydrogen 
production plant also has a number of closed loop component dependencies similar to 
those in the SI based plant. Therefore, the closed loop dependencies in the HTE plant 
schematic need to be modeled as equivalent open loop dependencies in the SAPHIRE 
model. 
A brief discussion of the HTE plant was included in Chapter I. The component 
information, stream line constituents, temperatures, pressures and all other necessary 
information for the SAPHIRE model are taken from the information generated by the 
HYSYS process analysis code at INL. The most recent flow sheet information from the 
HYSYS code is incorporated into the SAPHIRE model as the design evolved.  
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A. The SAPHIRE Model Development for HTE Plant 
The SAPHIRE model for the HTE plant is developed by evaluating the 
schematic of the HTE plant and selecting the top event for the fault tree. The entire HTE 
based hydrogen production process plant is then broken down into several sub sections, 
and the sub-section boundaries are defined. The master fault tree for this model is shown 
in Figure 35. The extensions to the master fault tree that consist of other fault trees and 
sub-trees for the HTE subsections are not shown here but have been handed over to 
GA/INL which consists of the complete SAPHIRE model. The SAPHIRE model for the 
HTE based hydrogen production plant has been developed to provide the maximum 
possible analysis flexibility. There will be an option to perform SAPHIRE analyses with 
or without the MHR included.  The SAPHIRE model is also capable of analyzing the 
system by either including or excluding the Brayton Cycle Power Conversion System 
(BC-PCS). In addition, during a run, the user can specify any particular redundancy that 
he or she chooses to consider in the analyses.  
 The system configuration, flow sheet and information about the 
component are obtained from the result of conceptual design for the High Temperature 
Electrolysis process using HYSYS at INL. Three transfer gates used in the main fault 
tree correspond to heat transfer section, hydrogen production section and make-up water 
plus oxygen section as shown and discussed briefly in Chapter I.  
 
 
B. Data Analysis for the Components of HTE Plant 
A combination of critical and degradation failure rates for each of the major 
components, mean repair time and their uncertainty are studied. Complete tables for 
these data are shown in Appendix B.  Five data sources as mentioned in Chapter VII 
have been evaluated for this purpose.  
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Fig. 35. Main fault tree for the HTE process. 
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No failure data for the electrolyzer (which is the major component of the HTE 
process) is found in any of the available data sources.  However, according to 
CERAMATEC (the provider of the electrolysis cells being developed at the INL), the 
expected mean time between failures for each cell is approximately 50,000 hours. The 
corresponding failure rate for the electrolyzer is derived from this expected mean time 
between failures. The electrolyzer is expected to experience 0.5% degradation in 1000 
hours. If it is assumed that failure of 25% of the cells constitutes total failure of the 
Electrolysis stack, then including 25% more cells than required along with the option to 
replace cells during operation would result in a highly reliable electrolyzer design.  Since 
no additional information is available, this assumption is made and corresponding failure 
rate derived from the mean failure time is used as the failure rate for the Electrolysis 
stack in the SAPHIRE analysis.  Although the above assumptions are made to simplify 
the analysis of the HTE process, this sort of approach may be taken in actual practice to 
achieve high reliability of the HTE plant design.   
 
 
 
C. Calculation for HTE Plant 
The fault tree analysis provides information on overall system reliability. The 
fault tree analysis also shows the contribution of each of the components to the overall 
failure rate of the system, the way the system reliability can be improved, and the 
fractional improvement of system reliability corresponding to individual component 
redundancies. The SAPHIRE model for this plant is developed in such a way that, it 
calculates the failure probability of the plant due to component failures and considers the 
plant as unavailable or out of service during the mean repair time of the failed 
components unless redundancies are included. 
Although more detailed information on risk reduction/increase and the 
uncertainly of results are generated and can be provided, only the cut set report, i.e., the 
different ways the plant can fail, are presented here.  
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Table XV shows the first 10 cut sets from a total of 25 cut sets generated for the 
HTE plant by the SAPHIRE analysis for a mission time of one year. The first 6 cut sets 
of this table are higher contributor for the system failure and are responsible for about 
88% of the total failure of the plant. This result indicates that the unavailability of the 
plant within a year is 0.02661, i.e., the accumulated time the HTE plant is likely to be 
out of service due to component failures and component repair time is about 233.1 hours 
or about 10 days. The table shows the component names and their corresponding failure 
contribution to the total system failure rate. 
 
 
 
TABLE XV  Cut Set for HTE Plant Including BC-PCS and No Redundancy 
 
Sort/Slice Cut Set Report 
Project: HTE_PLANT                                                                  Fault Tree: HTE-MAIN   
Min Cut Upper Bound:  2.661E-002 
 
 
 
 
Cut No. % Total % Cut Set Prob./Frequency Cut Sets 
1 30.71 30.71 8.172E-003 TURBINE 
2 44.59 13.88 3.692E-003 COMPRESSOR-HP 
3 58.47 13.88 3.692E-003 COMPRESSOR-LP 
4 68.28 9.81 2.609E-003 COMPRESSOR-H2REC-1 
5 78.09 9.81 2.609E-003 COMPRESSOR-PSC-1 
6 87.90 9.81 2.609E-003 COMPRESSOR-SSC-1 
7 89.85 1.96 5.188E-004 EXPAN-O2-STEAM 
8 91.58 1.73 4.585E-004 PUMP-MAKE-UP 
9 93.31 1.73 4.585E-004 PUMP-RECYCLE 
10 95.04 1.73 4.585E-004 PUMP-SW 
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These results show that components in the BC-PCS, especially rotating 
components like the turbine, compressors, etc., are the largest contributors to the overall 
system failure rate.  In reality the whole BC-PCS will be within a single housing, and 
individual components are not likely to be replaced. As a result, redundancy is not 
feasible for BC-PCS or for any of its major component. Therefore, our focus for this 
analysis is on the rest of the components in the HTE plant. Therefore, the SAPHIRE 
model for the HTE plant was then run without taking into consideration the BC-PCS. 
The results of this analysis are presented in Table XVI, which shows the 10 cut sets that 
are responsible for about 90% of the total system failure probability. In this case the 
main contributors to the system failures are the three compressors: H2-re-circulator, 
primary side circulator, and secondary side circulator.  
 
 
 
TABLE XVI  Cut Set for HTE Plant without Any Redundancy 
 
Sort/Slice Cut Set Report 
Project : HTE_PLANT                                                           Fault Tree: HTE-MAIN                 
Min Cut Upper Bound:  1.093E-2                                           Units: Not Specified 
Cut No. % Total % Cut Set Prob./Frequency Cut Sets 
1 23.88 23.88 2.609E-003 COMPRESSOR-H2REC-1 
2 47.75 23.88 2.609E-003 COMPRESSOR-PSC-1 
3 71.63 23.88 2.609E-003 COMPRESSOR-SSC-1 
4 76.38 4.75 5.188E-004 EXPAN-O2-STEAM 
5 80.58 4.20 4.585E-004 PUMP-MAKE-UP 
6 84.78 4.20 4.585E-004 PUMP-RECYCLE 
7 88.98 4.20 4.585E-004 PUMP-SW 
8 91.39 2.40 2.620E-004 TANK-H2-WATER 
9 93.79 2.40 2.620E-004 TANK-V100 
10 95.93 2.14 2.333E-004 TANK-H20-O2 
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Table XVI shows the first 10 cut sets from a total of 19 cut sets generated for the 
HTE plant using the SAPHIRE model for a mission time of one year. The unavailability 
of the plant during a year in this case is 0.01093, i.e., the accumulated time the HTE 
plant is likely to be out of service due to component failures and component repair time 
is about ~96 hours or about ~4 days. The third column of the table shows the failure 
contribution for each component. It shows where we have to use component redundancy 
to improve the system reliability and how much the system reliability will be improved 
by each redundancy. The first two and three components of above table account for 
about 48% and 72% respectively of total system failure.  
This calculation shows that the unavailability or outage of the HTE plant is less 
than both the MHR and the BC-PCS. The availability of the combination of MHR and 
the BC-PCS is about 90%. Even though the reliability of the HTE based hydrogen 
production plant is higher than both the MHR and BC-PCS, this reliability is advised for 
further improvement by adding component redundancies to minimize the probability of 
failed components in the HTE plant shutting down the entire system. This redundancy is 
incorporated to ensure that any possible failure of the HTE based nuclear hydrogen 
production process would happen due to failure of the component from either MHR or 
the BC-PCS but not due to failure of the HTE plant or its component. To reduce the 
system failure probability due to component failures in the HTE plant, the redundancies 
for the first three components in the above table are incorporated into the SAPHIRE 
model. As mentioned before, the user can include or exclude these redundancies for 
components during execution of the SAPHIRE model. 
Table XVII shows the unavailability of the plant with the three component 
redundancies. For this case, the calculated outage of the plant for a mission time of one 
year is 0.003947, i.e., ~35 hours. Therefore, these redundancies could be incorporated 
into the plant design to achieve higher reliabilities for the nuclear hydrogen production 
process.  
As was done for the SI process, additional analyses, including minimum cut set 
upper bound approximation, min/max quantification, importance analysis, etc., are 
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performed to check for inconsistencies in the analyses. Results from these analyses are 
not included here, but the results of a fault tree uncertainty analysis are presented in 
Figure 36.  This uncertainty analysis is based on Monte Carlo sampling, with uncertainty 
data for each component provided to the SAPHIRE model. Figure 36 shows the plot of 
the probability distribution and relevant statistical values for the analysis of the HTE 
plant.  
 
 
TABLE XVII  Cut Set for HTE Plant Only with Three Redundancies 
Sort/Slice Cut Set Report 
Project : HTE_PLANT                                                           Fault Tree: HTE-MAIN                 
Min Cut Upper Bound:  3.947E-003                                           Units: Not Specified 
Cut No % Total % Cut Set Prob./Frequency Cut Sets 
1 13.15 13.15 5.188E-004 EXPAN-O2-STEAM 
2 24.77 11.62 4.585E-004 PUMP-MAKE-UP 
3 36.39 11.62 4.585E-004 PUMP-RECYCLE 
4 48.01 11.62 4.585E-004 PUMP-SW 
5 54.65 6.64 2.620E-004 TANK-H2-WATER 
6 61.29 6.64 2.620E-004 TANK-V100 
7 67.91 6.61 2.609E-004 COMPRESSOR-H2REC-CCF 
8 74.52 6.61 2.609E-004 COMPRESSOR-PSC-CCF 
9 81.14 6.61 2.609E-004 COMPRESSOR-SSC-CCF 
10 87.05 5.91 2.333E-004 TANK-H20-O2 
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Fig. 36. Uncertainty analysis: Probability distribution for HTE plant model. 
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CHAPTER X 
SUMMARY 
 
Design modifications for a MHR for higher temperature operation and the 
reliability studies for the nuclear hydrogen production processes have been performed. 
An alternative coolant path through the permanent side reflector has been developed and 
evaluated. In addition, a new graphite block (fuel element) reactor core design has been 
evaluated and optimized. Using the alternative coolant scheme through PSR and the new 
core design together, the vessel temperature during steady-state operation has been 
reduced to about 350 0C, which is comparable to the vessel temperature in a LWR.  
The MHR with inlet and outlet temperatures of 590 0C and 950 0C, respectively 
had a calculated peak vessel temperature of 541 0C. With the alternative configuration 
for the coolant inlet flow through the PSR, the calculated vessel temperature during 
steady-state operation is reduced to ~421 0C. With the new graphite block (fuel element) 
core design the coolant inlet temperature is reduced to 482 0C. This reduced inlet 
temperature together with the alternative coolant scheme result a further reduction in the 
calculated vessel temperature to 350 0C. 
The reduced steady state reactor vessel temperature allows the MHR to operate at 
the higher coolant outlet temperatures which is required for efficient hydrogen 
production. In the original design of the MHR, 9Cr-1Mo-V was prescribed as the vessel 
material for the reactor vessel which is too costly compared to the vessel material of 
LWR. In addition, the fabrication of reactor vessel for MHR with high temperature 
material like 9Cr-1Mo-V and with the current size is not likely to be possible with the 
world’s existing facility. Therefore, it was necessary to reduce the vessel operating 
temperature or the vessel size to be consistent with the current existing facilities. 
Therefore, the reduction of vessel temperature will result in a significant reduction in the 
cost for the reactor vessel material and for the reactor design. In addition, due to this 
reduced vessel temperature the vessel can be made in any reasonable size. 
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During the design of the new inlet coolant passage, all limiting criteria are found 
to be within acceptable range. The amount of graphite removal is 10% of outer reflector 
which is well below the maximum limit of 20%. The pressure drop for the final design is 
~60 KPa which is well below the maximum allowable limit of ~90 KPa. The inlet 
coolant velocity is found to be consistent with the coolant velocity in the reactor core. 
The peak fuel temperature and peak vessel temperature of the reactor during both LPCC 
and HPCC transients are found to be within acceptable limits. 
 For the modification of reactor core design, the numbers of fissile and fertile 
particles are conserved in the final design. The dimensions of fuel rod, coolant hole, web 
thickness etc. in the final design are within design limit. The peak fuel temperature is 
maintained within acceptable limit.  
The new block design has a smaller hydraulic diameter, but due to the reduced 
inlet temperature, the mass flow rate through the reactor core is reduced from 324 kg/sec 
to 249.3 kg/sec, resulting in a pressure drop comparable to that of the current GT-MHR 
design. 
For the alternative coolant configuration, about ~10% of the graphite from the 
outer reflector (which is about ~5% graphite heat capacity for the entire core) is removed 
to accommodate the new coolant path. The removal of graphite may affect the neutron 
leakage from the reactor, neutron dose to the reactor vessel, criticality of the reactor, etc. 
Evaluation of those effects is beyond the scope of these studies and should be addressed 
in future work. At this conceptual design stage, the limits on the amount of graphite 
removal and acceptable inlet coolant flow velocities are based in large measure on 
previous experience and engineering judgment. More detailed assessments should be 
performed to proceed from this conceptual design stage to the preliminary and final 
design stages.  
With the new core deign the allowable ∆T across the reactor core is increased 
from 350 0C to ~468 0C. This increased ∆T across the reactor core results a reduced peak 
vessel temperature of ~350 0C – 360 0C at normal operating condition. Any possible 
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adverse influence of this higher ∆T across the reactor core to the flow stability or reactor 
performance, need to be addressed.  
To modify and evaluate the new reactor core design, the reactor core which 
already has the new coolant configuration through permanent side reflector has been 
used. The calculation for the core design modification with the original coolant 
configuration through the annular path between reactor core barrel and reactor vessel 
wall is not included.   
Two key parameters for these studies are core bypass flow and power 
distribution. Calculations show that for up to 15% core bypass flow, the PVT can be 
reduce to ~350 0C. If the bypass flow is about 20% then a portion of fuel may have 
temperatures above 1250 0C depending on the core power distribution. A detailed study 
of core bypass flow and precise power distributions consistent with the reactor core 
layout are recommended.    
The above calculations assume no bypass or leakage of the core coolant flow 
through the annular path between the core barrel and reactor vessel wall. Since even a 
small leak of helium through this annular path significantly affects the calculated vessel 
wall temperatures, preventing this leakage could be a major design requirement. 
Preventing of any possible leakage of inlet helium through the original coolant path 
needs to be addressed in future to avoid any excessive temperature rise of the reactor 
vessel during normal operation.  
SAPHIRE models for probabilistic risk analysis and for reliability/availability 
studies of the nuclear hydrogen production plants have been developed and evaluated. 
The Fault Tree models for both the SI and HTE based nuclear hydrogen production 
processes have been developed. These models have been used to evaluate the reliability 
and availability of the plants. The required redundancies are made to improve the system 
reliability and to optimize plant design. With several redundancies, the reliability of the 
plants found to be within acceptable levels.  
System reliability is determined based on equipment reliability which is 
determined based on component reliability. Failure data for each of the equipment is 
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used for this analysis, but the developed model can be extended up to component 
reliability. For these analyses five data sources have been used to collect failure data for 
the process equipment. Access to more data bases in future might help to get more 
relevant data for equipment and components.  
The common cause failure probabilities (as well as the alpha and beta factors) are 
determined based on the thumb rule for this analysis. A detailed study for exact alpha 
and beta factor and for common cause failure probability for each redundant component 
may be performed in the future. The cost for these redundancies might be addressed. In 
addition, the developed model does not develop its own maintenance schedule likely to 
follow the same maintenance schedule of the MHR.  
Some sections of the hydrogen production plant(s) are not included in the flow 
sheet yet, such as the water treatment plant, product hydrogen purification plant, etc. 
Therefore, failure of these support systems was not considered in this analysis. When 
more detailed information on these support systems becomes available, these systems 
could be included in the current model as part of future developmental design efforts.  
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APPENDIX A 
DATA FOR COMPONENTS OF SI PLANT 
 
 
Check valve 
Mean Failure Rate  
× 106 
Error Function/Standard Deviation 
× 106 
 
Item 
Description 
Data 
Source 
Type 
Critical Degrade  Incipient All 
Modes 
Critical Degrade 
 
Incipient All 
Modes 
Mean 
Repair 
Time 
(hrs) 
OREDA- 
P600 
CV, 
Chemical 
Injection 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
0.28 
0.29 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
0.39 
0.41 
--- 
--- 
EIReDA 
P93 
CV-Water --- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
0.22 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
3E+6 
--- 
15.0 
--- 
T-book 
P123-4 
CV --- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
0.98* 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
CCPS 
P198 
CV-Non-
Operated 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
3.18 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
Three check 
valve used 
before each 
Flash separator, 
Type of valves 
is unknown. 
T R Moss 
P256 
 --- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
2.0 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
*Fail to open = 2.8× 10-7, Fail to close = 7× 10-7, Total failure is 9.8× 10-7  
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Heat Exchanger 
Mean Failure Rate  
× 106 
Error Function/Standard Deviation 
× 106 
 
Item 
Description 
Data 
Source 
Fluid 
Critical Degrade  Incipient All 
Modes 
Critical Degrade 
 
Incipient All 
Modes 
Repair 
time (hrs) 
Crit/Deg/
Inc →All 
Modes 
OREDA-
P409 
Gas-
water/glycol 
4.25 
4.44 
4.51 
4.67 
54.12 
56.77 
63.03 
66.0 
5.77 
6.07 
4.39 
4.57 
58.29 
61.68 
56.57 
60.09 
11.0 
--- 
OREDA-
P405 
Gas/water 00 
00 
17.56 
28.52 
175.62 
270.98 
189.47 
299.50 
00 
00 
13.45 
28.51 
41.47 
203.60 
63.01 
245.26 
7.7 (mh) 
--- 
EIReDA-
P44 
Water/ 
Demateriali
zed water 
0.2 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
0.2 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
10E+6 
--- 
25 
--- 
T-book --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
CCPS-
P182 
Any 31.1 
--- 
25.8 
--- 
--- 
--- 
56.9 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
Heat 
Exchanger, 
Shell-tube, 
product/helium, 
E202-2, E202-
3, E202-4, 
E204, E205, 
E206, E207, 
E215, E306, 
E309 [E-HEL-
PRO] 
T R Moss 
P-255 
Any --- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
32.7 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
OREDA-
P413 
water/ 
glycol 
00 
00 
00 
00 
10.19 
10.63 
10.19 
10.63 
00 
00 
00 
00 
10.19 
10.63 
10.19 
10.63 
17.5 
--- 
EIReDA-
P44 
Water/ 
Dematerialize 
water 
0.2 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
0.2 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
10E+6 
--- 
25 
--- 
T-book --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
CCPS-
P182 
Any 31.1 
--- 
25.8 
--- 
--- 
--- 
56.9 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
Heat 
Exchanger, 
Shell-tube, 
water/product, 
R101, E102, 
E201, E208, 
E209, E210, 
E211, E212, 
E213, E214,  
[E-PRO-PRO-
W] 
T R Moss 
P-255 
Any --- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
32.7 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
OREDA-
P413 
water/ 
glycol 
00 
00 
00 
00 
10.19 
10.63 
10.19 
10.63 
00 
00 
00 
00 
10.19 
10.63 
10.19 
10.63 
17.5 
--- 
EIReDA-
P44 
Water/ 
Demateriali
zed water 
0.2 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
0.2 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
10E+6 
--- 
25 
--- 
T-book --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
CCPS-
P182 
Any 31.1 
--- 
25.8 
--- 
--- 
--- 
56.9 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
Heat 
Exchanger, 
Shell-tube, 
product/product
, E202-1, E203, 
E301, E302, 
E303, E304, 
E305, E307, 
E308,  [E-PRO-
PRO-W] 
T R Moss 
P-255 
Any --- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
32.7 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
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Power Recovery Devices: Turbine/liquid Expander 
Mean Failure Rate  
× 106 
Error Function/Standard Deviation 
× 106 
 
Item 
Description 
Data 
Source 
Power/ 
Purpose 
Critical Degrade  Incipient All 
Modes 
Critical Degrade Incipient All 
Modes 
Repair 
time 
(hrs) 
All 
Modes 
OREDA-
P129 
--/Gas 354.75 
553.77 
266.17 
369.56 
569.36 
1359.67 
1199.23 
2398.21 
312.92 
577.96 
189.13 
276.08 
569.36 
932.68 
808.20 
1648.61 
17.7 
--- 
OREDA-
P136 
-1 MW /Gas 
(Aero-
derivative) 
363.52 
590.62 
236.55 
364.69 
575.67 
936.50 
1186.51 
1909.61 
373.99 
767.34 
196.70 
352.71 
455.61 
968.51 
1186.51 
1909.61 
14.7 
--- 
OREDA-
P143 
-1 MW /Gas 364.05 
364.41 
123.31 
123.44 
120.91 
120.99 
601.1 
601.54 
48.51 
48.56 
107.57 
107.77 
50.62 
50.80 
182.47 
183.26 
19.7 
--- 
OREDA-
P144 
3-10 MW 
/Gas 
202.53 
257.67 
141.27 
181.76 
563.46 
732.87 
955.76 
1216.9 
65.71 
103.68 
38.89 
50.31 
31.69 
35.56 
102.33 
198.36 
5.1 
(9.3C) 
EIReDA-
P86 
Any/Steam, 
drives 
generator 
3200 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
3200 
--- 
2.3E+6 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
2.3E+6 
--- 
13 
--- 
T-book 
P192-3 
Standby, No 
data for 
Running 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
**4.6 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
3 
--- 
CCPS --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Gas Turbine, 
TE101 [GT], 
5987 shaft hp.  
T R Moss 
P-254 
--- --- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
*1235.8 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
OREDA-
P280 
Any/Combin
ed 
57.08 
57.08 
00 
00 
171.23 
171.23 
228.31 
228.31 
57.08 
57.08 
00 
00 
171.23 
171.23 
228.31 
228.31 
--- 
--- 
OREDA-
P281 
Gas 
Processing 
85.59 
101.91 
114.11 
135.89 
162.54 
208.65 
374.56 
469.46 
18.68 
21.98 
21.56 
25.38 
124.20 
176.84 
81.64 
163.41 
32.4 
(mh) 
EIReDA-
P86 
Any/Steam, 
drives 
generator 
3200 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
3200 
--- 
2.3E+6 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
2.3E+6 
--- 
13 
--- 
T-book 
P192-3 
Standby, No 
data for 
Running 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
**4.6 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
3 
--- 
CCPS --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Turbine-
Expander, 
Oxygen mixed 
with some other 
liquid, TE102 
[GT1], 135 
shaft hp 
T R Moss 
P-254 
Gas Turbine --- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
*1235.8 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
OREDA-
P272 
Any/ 
Expander 
72.61 
81.9 
91.82 
115.65 
302.06 
326.31 
459.16 
510.39 
27.31 
38.41 
54.01 
21.33 
259.49 
276.13 
204.5 
217.9 
32.4 
(73.4) 
(mh) 
EIReDA --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
T-book --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
CCPS --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Turbine-Liquid 
Expander, 
TE103A, 
TE103B, 
TE103C, 
TE201, TE301, 
TE302, TE303 
[LE1]  
T R Moss 
P-254 
Steam 
Turbine 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
29 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
*(4212+3550+1667+1484+865+525+491+320+240+205+35)÷11=1235.8 
**(7+2.2) )÷2=4.6 
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Pumps 
Mean Failure Rate  
× 106 
Error Function/Standard Deviation 
× 106 
 
Item 
Description 
Data 
Source 
Power 
/Fluid 
Critical Degrade  Incipient All 
Modes 
Critical Degrade 
 
Incipient All 
Modes 
MRT 
(hrs) 
 
OREDA-
P358 
Any/Chemical *2.28 
**2.31 
6.84 
6.93 
1.14 
1.15 
10.27 
10.39 
2.28 
2.31 
6.84 
6.93 
1.14 
1.15 
10.27 
10.39 
8.0 
9.0 
OREDA-
P359 
Any/Combined 00 
00 
00 
00 
13.53 
18.26 
13.53 
18.26 
00 
00 
00 
00 
13.53 
18.26 
13.53 
18.26 
1.5 
--- 
EIReDA-
P56 
<200kw/Water 200 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
200 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
2E+6 
--- 
20 
--- 
EIReDA-
P54 
1500-4500kw 
/water 
4 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
4 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
2.1E+6 
--- 
14 
--- 
T-book --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
CCPS-
P193 
Any/Any 104 
--- 
24 
--- 
--- 
--- 
128 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
Centrifugal 
Pump, 
(Chemical), 
52hp-250hp: 
P102, P103, 
P104 and P301, 
200-1500hp: 
P101 and P201, 
2752hp: P202, 
6952hp: P204. 
[CENT-PUMP-
CH] 
T R Moss 
P-254 
Any --- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
99† 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
OREDA-
P372 
Any/Water 24.0 
27.59 
11.89 
14.2 
26.26 
30.77 
64.59 
75.36 
19.4 
21.8 
11.89 
9.31 
32.63 
38.08 
59.93 
69.38 
31.4 
52.5C 
OREDA-
P361 
Any/Cooling 
Systems 
9.51 
16.65 
00 
00 
00 
00 
9.51 
16.65 
9.51 
16.65 
00 
00 
00 
00 
9.51 
16.65 
4 (mh) 
--- 
OREDA-
P360 
Any/Condensa
te processing 
18.01 
25.95 
7.61 
11.70 
5.19 
9.93 
30.01 
47.21 
12.22 
18.82 
6.98 
13.23 
8.51 
15.91 
15.99 
41.34 
17.6 
(37D) 
--- 
OREDA-
P359 
Any/Combined 00 
00 
00 
00 
13.53 
18.26 
13.53 
18.26 
00 
00 
00 
00 
13.53 
18.26 
13.53 
18.26 
1.5 
--- 
EIReDA-
P56 
<200hp/W 200 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
200 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
2E+6 
--- 
20 
--- 
40-60 Kg/s  
Horizontal 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
23.0 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
10 
--- 
75-150 Kg/s 
Horizontal 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
97 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
16 
--- 
T-book 
P81-84 
130-200 Kg/s 
Horizontal 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
11 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
12 
--- 
CCPS-
P193 
Any/Any 
 
104 
--- 
24 
--- 
--- 
--- 
128 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
Centrifugal 
Pump, (Water), 
44hp (P203 and 
P302) [CENT-
PUMP-W] 
T R Moss 
P-254 
Any --- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
99† 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
*First Line: Data for Calendar Time, **Second Line: Data for Operational Time 
†(250+194+88+32+22+8)÷6=99 
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Vessel/Tanks 
Mean Failure Rate  
× 106 
Error Function/Standard Deviation 
× 106 
 
Item 
Description 
Data 
Source 
Purpose/ 
Size 
Critical Degrade  Incipient All 
Modes 
Critical Degrade 
 
Incipient All 
Modes 
MRT 
 (hrs) 
OREDA-
P437 
Dist. Col 
(100-
300)m3 
00 
--- 
28.5 
28.74 
199.5 
201.15 
228.0 
229.89 
00 
--- 
28.5 
28.74 
199.5 
201.15 
228.0 
229.89 
46.8 (mh) 
-- 
EIReDA --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
T-book --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
CCPS --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Distillation 
Column, C201 
(0.07 bar, ~146 
m3), C301 (22 
bar, 276 m3) 
[DIST-
COLUMN] T R Moss --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
OREDA-
P444 
Flash Drum 
(1-10)m3 
11.57 
11.12 
30.90 
30.32 
122.34 
114.49 
172.46 
165.31 
23.58 
22.87 
59.01 
57.02 
225.09 
217.76 
326.72 
316.38 
5.3 
--- 
OREDA-
P446 
Flash Drum 
(10-50)m3 
28.16 
29.30 
25.08 
26.54 
234.55 
239.34 
301.67 
308.13 
42.65 
42.51 
21.68 
20.37 
447.86 
456.73 
509.09 
516.28 
6.1 
(8.5C, 
29.8D) 
OREDA-
P447 
Flash Drum 
(50-100)m3 
00 
00 
00 
00 
24.4 
25.50 
24.4 
25.50 
00 
00 
00 
00 
28.83 
30.06 
28.83 
30.06 
1.5 
--- 
EIReDA-
P82 
Feed water 
storage tank 
0.21 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
0.21 
--- 
10 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
16.8 
--- 
T-book --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
CCPS-
P205 
Metal 
vessel-
pressurized 
0.0109 
--- 
0.0636 
--- 
--- 
--- 
0.0745 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
Flash Drum, 
S102 (~3 m3) 
S201 (~55 m3), 
S202 (~52 m3), 
S203 (~35 m3),, 
S205 (~18 m3), 
T R Moss --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
OREDA-
P462 
Scrubber  
(1-10) m3 
27.83 
28.99 
22.31 
23.10 
105.96 
110.01 
151.67 
157.17 
42.83 
44.63 
34.14 
34.03 
88.32 
88.28 
141.58 
142.63 
9.7 
--- 
OREDA-
P464 
Scrubber 
(10-50) m3 
00 
00 
5.55 
5.75 
25.93 
27.00 
30.69 
32.00 
00 
00 
6.73 
7.08 
27.26 
29.07 
34.11 
36.27 
24.2 (mh) 
--- 
EIReDA-
P82 
Feed water 
storage tank 
0.21 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
0.21 
--- 
10 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
16.8 
--- 
T-book --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
CCPS-
P205 
Metal 
vessel-
pressurized 
0.0109 
--- 
0.0636 
--- 
--- 
--- 
0.0745 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
Scrubber, C101 
(~34 m3), C102 
(~340 m3), 
C104 (~45 m3), 
C302 (~4 m3), 
C303 (~5.5 m3) 
 
 
T R Moss 
P-255 
Scrubber --- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
16.0 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
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Vessel/Tanks (Continued) 
Mean Failure Rate  
× 106 
Error Function/Standard Deviation 
× 106 
 
Item 
Description 
Data 
Source 
Purpose/ 
Size 
Critical Degrade  Incipient All 
Modes 
Critical Degrade 
 
Incipient All 
Modes 
MRT 
 (hrs) 
OREDA-
P470 
Separator 
(1-10)m3 
10.69 
28.83 
94.50 
182.94 
136.00 
285.56 
250.41 
499.14 
7.5 
23.87 
52.23 
137.33 
76.86 
205.39 
132.28 
359.14 
2.4 
--- 
OREDA-
P472 
Separator 
(10-50)m3 
17.87 
18.24 
79.24 
81.45 
328.25 
336.66 
425.82 
436.81 
20.23 
20.53 
115.33 
119.44 
485.49 
499.41 
607.44 
626.13 
2.4 
--- 
EIReDA-
P82 
Feed water 
storage tank 
0.21 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
0.21 
--- 
10 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
16.8 
--- 
T-book --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
CCPS-
P205 
Metal 
vessel-
pressurized 
0.0109 
--- 
0.0636 
--- 
--- 
--- 
0.0745 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
Separator: S101  
(~50 m3), S104  
(~2.5 m3), S105 
(~1 m3), S204, 
S301 (~1.5 m3) 
 
 
T R Moss 
P-255 
Separator --- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
91.3 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
OREDA-
P416 
Vessel 24.45 
28.93 
24.66 
46.92 
132.17 
175.51 
185.04 
255.91 
31.26 
37.87 
45.37 
68.13 
257.74 
308.37 
326.82 
394.06 
7.0 
--- 
EIReDA-
P82 
Feed water 
storage tank 
0.21 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
0.21 
--- 
10 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
16.8 
--- 
T-book --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
CCPS 
P205 
Metal 
vessel-
pressurized 
0.0109 
--- 
0.0636 
--- 
--- 
--- 
0.0745 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
Reactor: , C103  
(~11 m3, C105  
(~185 m3 
 
 
T R Moss 
P255 
Reactor --- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
3.3 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
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APPENDIX B 
DATA FOR COMPONENTS OF HTE PLANT 
 
 
Compressors 
Mean Failure Rate  
× 106 
Error Function/Standard Deviation 
× 106 
Item 
Description 
Data 
Source 
Power 
Critical Degrade Incipient All 
Modes 
Critical Degrade 
 
Incipient All 
Modes 
Mean 
Repair 
Time 
(hrs) 
Population/ 
Installation 
/No of 
Demand 
OREDA-
P86 
--- 73.49 
107.71 
149.69 
232.74 
236.67 
391.87 
564.28 
878.17 
21.92 
37.79 
135.8 
236.44 
215.10 
401.18 
305.35 
615.17 
18.7 22/8/2469 
EIReDA --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
T-book --- --- --- --- -- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
CCPS --- --- --- --- -- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Centrifugal, 
Turbine 
Driven, 
HPC-
102MW, 
LPC-
98MW,  
T R Moss 
P-254 
--- 
Tur/Elec 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
1678 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 3/---/--- 
OREDA-
P79 
0.1-1 
MW 
151.76 
256.43 
74.98 
115.01 
344.86 
643.71 
579.49 
1047.2 
117.91 
262.19 
30.06 
89.52 
363.13 
773.08 
544.05 
1177.9 
13.8 
31.4D 
5/3/1299 
OREDA-
P81 
1-3 MW 179.76 
205.57 
157.62 
187.43 
661.08 
744.21 
991.89 
1129.0 
184.69 
206.86 
33.34 
56.17 
604.93 
651.89 
823.08 
890.57 
9.1 
(15D) 
6/5/815 
EIReDA-
P26 
360 KW  
 
93 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
93 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
10E+6 
--- 
21 2/1/--- 
T-book --- --- --- --- -- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
CCPS-
P189 
Any 
 
2470.0 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
2470.0 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- ---/---/--- 
Centrifugal, 
Electric 
Driven, 
PSC-
1071kw, 
SSC-880kw, 
H2-Rec-
8kw 
T R Moss 
P-254 
--- 
Tur/Elec 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
1678 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 3/---/--- 
*(2694+1700+640)÷3=1678 
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Electrolyzer 
Mean Failure Rate  
× 106 
Error Function/Standard Deviation 
× 106 
Item 
Description 
Data Source 
Critical Degrade Incipient All 
Modes 
Critical Degrade 
 
Incipient All 
Modes 
Mean 
Repair 
Time 
(hrs) 
Population/ 
Installation/ 
No of 
Demand 
OREDA --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
EIReDA --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
T-book --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
CCPS --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
T R Moss --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Electrolyzer 
CERAMATEC * 2 --- --- 2 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
*This data was collected by telephone from CERAMATEC: 
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Generators 
Mean Failure Rate  
× 106 
Error Function/Standard Deviation 
× 106 
Item 
Description 
Data 
Source 
Power 
/Purpose 
Critical Degrade Incipient All 
Modes 
Critical Degrade 
 
Incipient All 
Modes 
Mean 
Repair 
Time 
(hrs) 
Population/ 
Installation/ 
No of 
Demand 
OREDA-
P321 
Any/ 
Main 
83.61 
98.74 
50.08 
57.68 
70.87 
76.24 
215.80 
240.24 
21.05 
41.87 
35.82 
39.26 
66.43 
68.79 
140.99 
145.46 
14.2 8/3/166 
OREDA-
P330 
20-30 
KVA 
/Main 
57.67 
75.99 
105.59 
123.98 
180.80 
238.48 
348.04 
437.81 
37.63 
38.30 
118.04 
139.09 
103.70 
119.38 
178.85 
162.76 
31.7 
 
12/5/2691 
EIReDA 
P190 
900 MW 
/Main 
20 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
20 
--- 
4E+6 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
4E+6 
--- 
192 1/1/-- 
EIReDA 
P190 
1300 
MW 
/Main 
15 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
15 
--- 
10E+6 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
10E+6 
--- 
500 1/1/-- 
T-book --- --- --- --- -- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
CCPS --- --- --- --- -- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Turbine 
Driven, 
~300 MW 
T R Moss 
P-254 
---/--- 1667 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
1667 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 1/1/-- 
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Heat Exchangers 
Mean Failure Rate  
× 106 
Error Function/Standard Deviation 
× 106 
Item 
Description 
Data 
Source 
Fluid 
Critical Degrade  Incipient All 
Modes 
Critical Degrade 
 
Incipient All 
Modes 
Mean 
Repair 
Time 
(hrs) 
Population/ 
Installation 
/No of 
Demand 
OREDA
-P406 
Gas/Gas --- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
11.84 
12.82 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
16.75 
18.13 
--- 2/1/21720 
EIReDA --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
T-book --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
CCPS-
P182 
Any 31.1 
--- 
25.8 
--- 
--- 
--- 
56.9 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- --- 
Heat 
Exchanger, 
Shell-Tube, 
helium/ 
helium 
IHE,  
T R 
Moss 
P-255 
Any --- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
32.7 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 1/1/--- 
OREDA
-P405 
Gas/ 
Water 
00 
00 
17.56 
28.52 
175.62 
270.98 
189.5 
299.5 
00 
00 
13.45 
28.51 
41.47 
203.6 
63.01 
245.26 
7.7 
(mh) 
6/2/--- 
OREDA
-P404 
Gas/ 
Condensate 
00 
00 
00 
00 
114.16 
114.16 
114.16 
114.16 
00 
00 
00 
00 
114.16 
114.16 
114.16 
114.16 
5.0 
(mh) 
1/1/--- 
EIReDA --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
T-book --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
CCPS-
P182 
Any 31.1 
--- 
25.8 
--- 
--- 
--- 
56.9 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- --- 
Heat 
Exchanger, 
Shell-Tube, 
Helium/ 
water 
Regenerator 
-3 and 5  
T R 
Moss 
P-255 
Any --- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
32.7 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 1/1/--- 
OREDA
-P413 
water/ 
glycol-
water/ 
glycol 
00 
00 
00 
00 
10.19 
10.63 
10.19 
10.63 
00 
00 
00 
00 
10.19 
10.63 
10.19 
10.63 
17.5 4/1/--- 
EIReDA
-P42 
W/DW, 
30/220C 
7/155 bar 
1.0 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
1.0 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
10E+6 
--- 
25 2/1/--- 
EIReDA
-P44 
DW/DW, 
200/300C 
155 bar 
0.2 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
0.2 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
10E+6 
--- 
25 9/1/33430 
EIReDA
-P46 
DW, 
50/220C 
7/50 bar 
1.27 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
1.27 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
10E+6 
--- 
72 2/1/--- 
T-book --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
CCPS-
P182 
Any 31.1 
--- 
25.8 
--- 
--- 
--- 
56.9 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- --- 
Heat 
Exchanger, 
Shell-tube, 
water/water  
Recuperator, 
Regenerator
-1, 2, 6, and 
7 
T R 
Moss 
P-255 
Any --- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
32.7 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 1/1/--- 
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Pumps 
Mean Failure Rate  
× 106 
Error Function/Standard Deviation 
× 106 
Item 
Description 
Data 
Source 
Power/Pur
pose/Mode 
Critical Degrade Incipient All 
Modes 
Critical Degrade 
 
Incipient All 
Modes 
Mean 
Repair 
Time 
(hrs) 
Population/ 
Installation 
/No of 
Demand 
 
OREDA
-P372 
Any/Water 
/Running 
24.0 
27.59 
11.89 
14.2 
26.26 
30.77 
64.59 
75.36 
19.4 
21.8 
11.89 
9.31 
32.63 
38.08 
59.93 
69.38 
31.4 
52.5C 
24/6/1590 
OREDA
-P361 
Any/Cooli
ng system/ 
Running 
9.51 
16.65 
00 
00 
00 
00 
9.51 
16.65 
9.51 
16.65 
00 
00 
00 
00 
9.51 
16.65 
4 (mh) 6/1/150 
OREDA
-P359 
Any/ 
Combined 
/Running 
00 
00 
00 
00 
13.53 
18.26 
13.53 
18.26 
00 
00 
00 
00 
13.53 
18.26 
13.53 
18.26 
1.5 3/1/--- 
EIReDA
-P56 
<200 
hp/W 
37.4†† 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
37.4†† 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
3E+6 
--- 
20 --- 
EIReDA
-P58 
28/75 KW/ 
Running 
11.7 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
11.7 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
10E+6 
--- 
18 2/1/32360 
T-book 
P81 
40-60 Kg/s 
Horizontal 
/Running 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
23.0 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
10 30/---/--- 
CCPS-
P193 
Any/Any/ 
Running 
104 
--- 
24 
--- 
--- 
--- 
128 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- --- 
Centrifugal 
Pump, 
(Water) 
SWP-94 
KW, MWP-
138 KW, 
RP-1 KW  
T R 
Moss 
P-254 
Any/Any/ 
Running 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
99† 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 6/---/--- 
*First Line: Data for Calendar Time 
**Second Line: Data for Operational Time 
†(250+194+88+32+22+8)÷6=99 
††37.4: This pump was used only in case of accident and the failure rate is 200E-6 and 
EF is 3, sample and reliability parameter are estimated by expert judgment. Failure rate 
of drain pump on feed water system is 37.4E-6 and EF is 3  
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Power Recovery Devices: Turbine/Liquid Expander 
Mean Failure Rate  
× 106 
Error Function/Standard 
Deviation 
× 106 
Item 
Description 
Data 
Source 
Power/ 
Purpose 
Critical Degrade Incipient All 
Modes 
Critical Degrade 
 
Incipient All 
Modes 
Mean 
Repair 
Time 
(hrs) 
Population 
/Installation 
/No of 
Demand 
OREDA-
P129 
Any /Gas 354.75 
553.77 
266.17 
369.56 
569.36 
1359.67 
1199.2 
2398.2 
312.92 
577.96 
189.1 
276.1 
619.28 
893.14 
880.20 
1648.61 
17.7 
(27C) 
84/23/11096 
OREDA-
P148 
20-40 MW 
/Gas 
373.37 
756.82 
272.44 
462.24 
660.98 
1233.57 
1326.0 
2477.5 
491.76 
1136.9 
205.9 
396.6 
591.14 
1366.7 
1247.64 
2858.08 
15.2 
(23.7C) 
15/5/3512 
EIReDA-
P86 
Any/Steam, 
Drives Aux-
Generator 
3200 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
3200 
--- 
2.3E+6 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
2.3E+6 
--- 
13 2/1/358 
T-book 
P192-3 
Standby, No 
data for 
Running 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
**4.6 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
3 --- 
CCPS --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Gas 
Turbine, 
511.5 
MW 
T R Moss 
P-254 
Gas --- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
*1236 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 11/---/--- 
OREDA-
P280 
Any/ 
Combined 
57.08 
57.08 
00 
00 
171.23 
171.23 
228.31 
228.31 
57.08 
57.08 
00 
00 
171.23 
171.23 
228.31 
228.31 
--- 1/1/--- 
OREDA-
P281 
Gas 
Processing 
85.59 
101.91 
114.11 
135.89 
162.54 
208.65 
374.56 
469.46 
18.68 
21.98 
21.56 
25.38 
124.20 
176.84 
81.64 
163.41 
32.4 
(mh) 
8/2/--- 
EIReDA-
P86 
Any/Steam, 
drives 
generator 
3200 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
3200 
--- 
2.3E+6 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
2.3E+6 
--- 
13 2/1/358 
T-book --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
CCPS --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
O2/Steam 
Expander, 
9.356 
MW 
T R Moss --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
*(4212+3550+1667+1484+865+525+491+320+240+205+35)÷11=1236 
**(7+2.2)÷2=4.6 
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Vessel: Knockout Tanks 
Mean Failure Rate  
× 106 
Error Function/Standard Deviation 
× 106 
Item 
Description 
Data 
Source 
Purpose 
/Size 
Critical Degrade Incipient All 
Modes 
Critical Degrade 
 
Incipient All 
Modes 
Mean 
Repair 
Time 
(hrs) 
Population/ 
Installation 
/No of 
Demand 
OREDA
-P470 
Separator 
(1-10)m3 
10.69 
28.83 
94.50 
182.94 
136.00 
285.56 
250.41 
499.14 
7.5 
23.87 
52.23 
137.33 
76.86 
205.39 
132.28 
359.14 
2.4 50/5/--- 
OREDA
-P472 
Separator 
(10-50)m3 
17.87 
18.24 
79.24 
81.45 
328.25 
336.66 
425.82 
436.81 
20.23 
20.53 
115.33 
119.44 
485.49 
499.41 
607.44 
626.13 
2.4 11/7/--- 
EIReDA
-P82 
Feed water 
storage 
tank 
0.21 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
0.21 
--- 
10 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
16.8 ---/---/36 
T-book --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---  --- 
CCPS-
P205 
Metal 
vessel-
pressurized 
0.0109 
--- 
0.0636 
--- 
--- 
--- 
0.0745 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
 --- 
Knockout 
Tank 
i.e. 
Separator 
T R 
Moss 
P-255 
Separator --- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
91.3 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
 1/1/--- 
 
 135 
VITA 
 
S.M. Mohsin Reza, son of Mrs. Monwara Begum and the late Tosir Uddin 
Sarker, was born in Rajshahi, Bangladesh. After completing his first 10 years of 
education he continued his study at Rajshahi Polytechnic Institute (Bangladesh) and 
received his Diploma-in Engineering degree in electrical engineering in March 1989. He 
then attended Dhaka University of Engineering and Technology (DUET), Gazipur, 
Bangladesh, and received his Bachelor of Science in electrical and electronic 
engineering in March 1994, with a focus on electrical control systems. He started his 
career at the Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB) and worked there until 
March 1996. In March 1996, he was employed by the Bangladesh Atomic Energy 
Commission (BAEC). During his career at BAEC, Mr. Reza worked at a Radioactive 
Beach-Mineral Separating Plant at Cox’s Bazar, and then at the Institute of Nuclear 
Science and Technology, Savar, Dhaka. At the end of his career at BAEC, he was posted 
to TRIGA MARK-II Research Reactor, the only reactor facility in Bangladesh. He then 
joined the Nuclear Engineering Department of Texas A&M University in the fall of 
2000 for his graduate studies. He received his Master of Science degree in nuclear 
engineering in December 2002. The title of the thesis for his Master of Science program 
was ‘Simulation of Subcooled Boiling at Low Pressure Conditions with RELAP-3D 
Computer Program’. He continued his graduate studies and received his Ph.D. in nuclear 
engineering in May 2007. He may be contacted through his postal address at: 
Department of Nuclear Engineering, Texas A&M University, 129 Zachry Engineering 
Center, TX 77843-3133 or through email at rezasmm@hotmail.com. 
